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INTRODUCTION
The traditional model of contract interpretation focuses on the "meeting
of the minds." Parties agree on how to structure their respective obligations
and rights and then specify their agreement in a written document. Gaps and
ambiguities are inevitable. But where contract language exists for the point
in contention and a dispute arises as to the meaning of this language, courts
attempt to divine what the parties intended. Among the justifications for
deferring to the intent of the parties is the assumption that parties know what
is best for themselves.' Deference also arguably furthers autonomy values.
Not all contracts and contract terms are individually negotiated. Stan
dard-form or boilerplate contracts are common in the commercial world.
Standard-form contracts have received considerable attention from commen
tators. 2 The focus has been on the problem of power and informational
asymmetries among the contracting parties. One party dictates the terms
for example, a big consumer-goods producer may draft a standard-form con
tract that forms a mandatory part of all consumer purchases.
Boilerplate contracts, however, are found in many markets where the re
lationship between the parties is not characterized by power imbalances.
Instead, we find sophisticated parties on both sides and a multitude of par
ties with their slight variations on the same set of boilerplate terms. Large
portions of the markets for bonds and derivatives are dominated by boiler
plate of this type. Our goal is to suggest that the interpretation of boilerplate
contracts among sophisticated parties is a topic in need of attention.3 We
contend that general principles of contract interpretation should not apply to
this important subset of commercial contracts and make the case that these
contracts are better viewed as akin to statutes.
A handful of courts have taken modified interpretive approaches, recog
nizing the special nature of boilerplate contracts in markets consisting of
sophisticated parties. These courts have recognized that uniformity in the
interpretation of this language is important because it enables the underlying
financial instruments to be priced and traded. Such courts have adhered
strictly to the textual language of the contract,4 displayed a reluctance to
I. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the limits of Contract Law,
113 YA LE L.J. 541, 618 (2003) (arguing that the principle of deferring to party intent applies
strongly in the case of sophisticated commercial transactors).
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L.
2.
REV. 679; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943); K.N. Llewellyn, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939) (book review); w.
David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 529, 530 (1971).
3.
Little economic analysis exists on contract interpretation. See Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tux. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (2005). Alan Schwartz
and Robert Scott undertake an examination of how courts should interpret the contracts of sophisti
cated commercial parties. Schwartz & Scott, supra note I.
4.
See Broad v. Rockwell Int'! Corp. , 642 F.2d 929, 947 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). The Fifth
Circuit found the disputed contract language unambiguous even though (a) a prior panel had found
the language ambiguous and, (b) there was evidence of significant differences of opinion among
expert lawyers (and not just the litigators) as to the meaning of the language. Id. at 932-40, 955. The
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5
imply good faith duties, and applied judge-made analysis of the economic
interests of the parties where the contractual language is undeniably am
6
biguous. Courts have also applied deference to prior court interpretations of
the same language (assuming that if the market had had a problem with the
prior court interpretation, the market would have corrected the language). 7
Courts are right in recognizing the need for uniformity in markets that
use boilerplate. We part company with them in terms of strategies that will
promote uniformity, such as the preference for textualism and the willing
ness to defer to prior court interpretations. Over time, slight mutations in the
8
precise language that different actors have in their contracts often emerge mutations which may not have any particular meaning for the contracting
parties and that a court taking a textualist approach may attach too great
weight. Different boilerplate terms may get cobbled together in the same
contract, leading to potential inconsistencies when interpreted through a
purely textualist approach. The chance for court error in interpreting boiler
plate is therefore high.
Rather than have courts attempt the error-prone process of determining
what would be in the parties' best interests, we argue that courts should take
a more statutory approach to interpreting boilerplate terms. Specifically,
courts should look to the intent of the original drafters of the terms, much
like courts look to legislative intent in interpreting statutes. In discerning
this intent, the court may need to look to the overall history of a term, the
process by which the term became a standard (or one of the standards) in the
industry, and its context within the greater commercial environment.
Like the textualists, we argue that courts should not make an inquiry into
the actual intent of a specific set of contracting parties (or try to divine the
hypothetical bargain that the parties might have wanted to strike). Boiler
plate terms, absent guidance from the initial drafters of the terms or other
market standard setters, inevitably will become less clear over time. As par
ties include boilerplate terms drafted years if not decades earlier as a matter
of course, looking to the specific intent of any one set of current contracting
court explained that finding the language ambiguous would result in an investigation into party
intentions that would be detrimental for at least two reasons: (a) it would produce variation in the
understanding of a term that the market wanted a standardized understanding of, and (b) the boiler
plate nature of these clauses meant that the parties probably hadn't negotiated them which, in turn,
meant that investigating party intentions would be pointless. Id. at 947 n. 20; see also Leverso v.
SouthTrust Bank of Ala. , 18 F.3d 1527, 1534 (I Ith Cir. 1994); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Alpert, 10 F.
Supp. 2d 290, 305 (S. D.N.Y. 1998); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 88�82 (Del. Ch. 1986).
5.
CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Cent. do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105, 1115 n. 8
(S. D.N.Y. 1995); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1521 (S. D.N.Y.
1989); Katz, 508 A. 2d at 880-82.
6.
E.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048-51 (2d
Cir. 1982).
7. See Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1541-42
(S. D.N.Y. 1983).
8.
E.g. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practices,
80 TuLANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (describing the slight mutations that occur in the modifica
tion and pari passu clauses for Colombia, China, and Italy over the 1985-2005 period) (draft on file
with authors).
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(and litigating) parties becomes meaningless. The lack of meaning would
not be a problem if such terms were merely benign appendices to a contract.
However, as in the case of the pari passu clause for sovereign bond agree
ments we discuss in this Article, boilerplate terms may take on unexpected
meanings that radically alter the distribution of rights and duties among con
tracting parties.
Deference to the intentions of the specific parties before a court is espe
cially inappropriate where there are third party effects. 9 In the contexts on
which we focus, an interpretation of the contract language in one case will
impact the contracts for a multitude of other parties who all have essentially
the same boilerplate language in their contracts. Deferring to the intentions
of the parties to the dispute may produce problems where these parties do
not represent the interests of the others in the market who have no say in the
current litigation. We therefore argue that courts should not attempt to sup
plement the explicit language of a contract with evidence from the parties'
course of dealings or performance as suggested under the Uniform Com
0
mercial Code. 1
Referring to historical meaning and the intent of the original drafters is a
form of contextual analysis. Rather than looking at the context of the spe
cific set of contracting parties before the court, though, our approach has
courts looking at the context of the original drafters of the term in the case
of boilerplate, taking a "statutory" approach to the interpretation of boiler
plate terms. Looking to the historical context of a term, we argue, provides
the highest probability of divining an interpretation that best maximizes the
interests of contracting parties (and thus, approximates what the parties
would have wanted to adopt ex ante had they focused on the particular issue
at hand). Individually, contracting parties may choose (rationally) not to
contract for every contingency and clarify the meaning of every term. For
many contractual contingencies, any single set of contracting parties may
find it too costly both to identify the exact nature of the contingency and to
specify how the contract should deal with the contingency. Where the con
tingency is commonly faced throughout an industry, the single set of parties
ignores the positive external benefit to others from expending resources in
drafting and clarifying an applicable contract term. A centralized source for
terms, such as an industry association or attorney firm (designated a "stan
dard setter") that originally drafted the terms, in contrast, will have
internalized the benefit to the group of adopters of the terms to the extent
the standard setter profited from more adoptions when first promulgating the
terms. Where the interests of contracting parties today are not too different
from those at the time of the initial adoption, looking to the historical record

9.
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1114-15, 1182-88 (2003).
10.
See David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of
Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REv. 617, 620--22 (2001) (describing the U.C.C.'s interpretive
hierarchy).
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will result in interpretations that better approximate the goals of the industry
or trade compared with any single set of contracting parties.
Minimizing error costs in court interpretations is particularly important
in the case of boilerplate terms. The market faces large failures in the ability
of dispersed participants to modify boilerplate terms effectively over time to
take into account changing business conditions and error-prone court inter
pretations. Dispersed parties may not coordinate to change a term after a
court error in interpretation. Faced with the possibility that others may not
change a term, a specific set of parties may not wish to deviate from the
standard. Deviating, for example, may signal to the market that the parties
are particularly litigious and, in the case of fast-paced transactions, delay a
deal from going forward.
Compared with courts, the original drafters of boilerplate terms-that is,
the original standard setters-enjoy an expertise advantage and internalize
the benefit to the range of market participants that will adopt the boiler
plate.11 Also, deferring to historical context and the intent of the original
drafters will induce market-based standard setters to coordinate in creating
new, clearer terms as well as authoritative definitions and modifications to
the existing pool of boilerplate terms. Doing so allows the standard setters
developing the new terms to achieve "original drafter" status, thereby ob
taining court deference to the standard setters' interpretation for those
parties that adopt the new terms.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss two examples of
boilerplate terms drawn from the sovereign bond and privately negotiated
derivatives markets. In Part II, we explore reasons why markets may have
trouble responding to litigation or other interpretive shocks. We set forth in
Part III our thesis that judges should interpret commercial boilerplate con
tracts using an analytical framework closer to statutory analysis than
conventional contract analysis.
I. Two CASE STUDIES
Contracts are negotiated in a variety of contexts and involve parties with
varying degrees of skill and experience. We focus on the subset of contracts
dealing with boilerplate terms in a sophisticated, commercial context. We
provide two case studies of commercial boilerplate terms to start our discus
sion.
A. The Case of the Pari Passu Clause
Perhaps the most litigated and most controversial term in the history of
sovereign debt is the pari passu clause. This term is found in practically every
single sovereign debt contract, whether it is a syndicated loan agreement or a

11.
See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 908 n.231 ( 1992) ("[W]hile judges may be good surrogates for the rationally igno
rant consumer, they are often deficient interpreters of more specialized usages of trade.").
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12
bond indenture. Indeed, in U.S.- and English-law-governed documents, the
clause is considered so important that it is one of the handful of terms that
typically gets repeated at the front of the prospectus in the summary of es
13
sential terms. A typical formulation of the clause goes as follows:
"The obligations of the debtor under this instrument hereunder do rank
and will rank pari passu in priority of payment with all other External In
1
debtedness of the debtor." 4
What does that mean? In the corporate context, there is a meaning on
15
which commentators agree. Those whose debts rank pari passu will get
paid on an equal priority in the event of an insolvency distribution. The pari
passu clause serves to contract around the default rule in some jurisdictions
16
that otherwise gives priority to debts that are incurred earlier in time. What
does the clause mean when the debtor cannot go bankrupt, as in the case of
sovereign lenders? The leading commentators on sovereign contracts ac
17
knowledged that there exists ambiguity as to the meaning of this clause.
The presence of ambiguity, in tum, provided an opportunity for rent seek18
mg.
19
In 2000, in Elliott Associates v. Peru, Elliott, a vulture fund, argued that
the pari passu clause meant that a sovereign could not make preferential
payments to any of its creditors whose debt ranked pari passu with the debt
that they held. Peru had concluded a restructuring with a number of its
•

12.
This Section of the Article summarizes the research we have been doing for a separate
article-length treatment of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments. That article com
bines both qualitative and quantitative research on both the evolution of the clause and the various
litigations. In all, we looked at more than 250 sovereign debt contracts for over thirty countries (with
in-depth time-series treatments of the evolutions of the clauses for twenty countries). Every single
contract we examined, whether from a private or public deal, had a pari passu clause in it. See
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, When Sophisticated Parties Fail To Cure Ambiguities Caused by
a Litigation Shock: The Puzzle of the Pari Passu Case (Dec. 22, 2005) (unpublished tables and
interview notes on file with authors).
13.
We found this to be true in over ninety -five percent of the sovereign debt contracts in the
database that we used for this project. When we talk about "contracts," we are talking about the
contract language that is reproduced in the prospectuses. We are assuming, therefore, that the pro
spectuses are accurate when they tell us that they are reproducing the relevant contractual terms.
Choi & Gulati, supra note 12.
14.
See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, How To NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 83, 85
(2d ed. 2000) (setting forth variations of pari passu language).
15.
See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt In
struments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 872-76 (2004) (discussing commentary on the meaning of the clause
in the corporate context); G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign P iracy, 56 Bus. LAW. 635,
637 (2001).
16.
See FINANCIAL MARKETS LAW COMMITTEE, ISSUE 79 -Pari Passu CLAUSES (2005)
[hereinafter FMLC REPORT], available at http://www. fmlc. org/papers/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf.
17. See Gulati & Klee, supra note 15, at 643-64 (citing discussions by Buchheit, Wood, and
Lowenfeld).
18.
See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis ofArticle 2 's Incorporation Strat
egy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI L. REv. 710, 740-42 (1999).
.

19.
194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). For a discussion of the case, see William W. Bratton, Pari
Passu and a Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823, 823-25 (2004). See also
Gulati & Klee, supra note 15, at 635-38 (summarizing the facts behind the Elliott Associates case).
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bondholders and was about to disburse a large payment to its European
holders of Brady bonds via Euroclear. A Brussels court ruled, ex parte, in
Elliott's favor, granting an injunction against Euroclear. Peru's government,
with Alberto Fujimori in his final days in power, was in a precarious state,
and did not want to be seen as defaulting on its Brady bonds. The end result
was that Elliott got paid in full-upwards of $55 million on bonds that cost
20
it approximately $11 million.
The ruling suddenly gave holdouts the teeth to disrupt sovereign debt re
structurings. That sent the sovereign bond world into a tizzy, generating an
21
immense volume of speeches, articles, and policy recommendations. De
spite a lack of clarity as to what the pari passu clause meant in the sovereign
context, the sovereigns and their advisers were quite adamant that the clause
did not prohibit non-pro-rata payments to creditors under conditions of de
22
fault. Sovereigns had always thought that they were entitled to pay their
2
favored creditors on a priority basis, especially when in financial crisis. 3
The de facto priority that the official-sector lenders (the IMF, the ADB, the
World Bank, etc.) enjoyed when lending to sovereigns in distress provided
2
evidence for the sovereigns' view. 4 On the other side, the holdout creditors
and their lawyers were equally firm. The plain language of the clause al
lowed for only one sensible meaning, they said, which was that the
25
sovereign had to pay all its creditors on a pro rata basis.
Once Elliott won against Peru, others tried to replicate the pari passu
strategy whenever there was a restructuring (and even if the strategy was not
used, the sovereign had to take into consideration the risk that the strategy
would be used). In the immediate four-year period after the Elliott decision,
holdout investors filed suit against sovereigns (the Congo, Nicaragua, and
26
Argentina) in courts located in Belgium, England, and the United States. In
some of the cases, the holdouts won and managed to extract significant
20.
The facts in this paragraph are taken from Bratton, supra note 19, at 823-25, and Gulati
& Klee, supra note 15, at 635-36.
21. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, FINANCIAL CRISES AND WHAT To Do ABOUT THEM 75-76
(2002); NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS?: RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL
CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (2004); HAL ScoTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (12th ed. 2005);
Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 177, 186-87 (2005); Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign
Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 299 (2005).
22.

Felix Salmon, Pari Passu Clause Is a Threat to Markets, EuROMONEY, May 2004, at 148.

23.

Id.

24. The various litigations are described in Buchheit & Pam, supra note 15, at 900-16, and
Phillip R. Wood, Pari Passu Clauses-What Do They Mean?, 2003 BuTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANK
ING & FIN. L. 371. See also SCOTT, supra note 21, at 307-11 (providing an overview of the pari
passu controversy).
25. The holdout-creditor view is most forcefully articulated in the affidavit of Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld that is described in Gulati & Klee, supra note 15, at 636-37. See also Salmon,
supra note 22 (quoting Professor Hal Scott).
26.
The Peru, Congo, and Nicaragua litigations are described in Buchheit & Pam, supra note
15, at 877-82, 887-80. For a brief discussion of the Argentine pari passu litigation, see Anna
Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2005, at 19, 22,
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/gelpern0405.pdf.
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2
settlements. 7 More important, the sovereign lawyers have not been able to
get any of the courts in these jurisdictions to adopt their interpretation of the
.
2s
pan passu cl ause.
Whatever the merits of the Brussels court's interpretations, one would
expect that all contracts after the Elliott case would pay special attention to
the pari passu clause and clarify its exact meaning. Economic theory tells us
that absent significant negotiation costs, parties will prefer contracts that are
clear rather than contracts that present a high likelihood of uncertainty and
litigation costs. The questions of (a) the degree to which sovereigns and
their creditors modified their contract language in the wake of the Elliott
case, and (b) the reasons for why individual sovereigns did or did not alter
their contractual language, formed the basis for a parallel line of research
we have pursued examining a dataset of sovereign bond deals from the early
29
1990s to the early 2000s. Below, we summarize the findings.
1. Patterns in the Data
For the thirty-plus countries for which we examined pari passu clauses
in both the pre- and post-Elliott-periods, we found wide variation in the pre
cise wording of the clause. Specifically, we found upwards of a dozen
different versions of the clause.30 In light of the Elliott ruling, and the strict
textualist approach utilized there, the variations across countries tum out to
be important. Clauses saying something like "the debt will rank equally with
all other External Indebtedness" are less vulnerable to an Elliott-type attack
than language saying "the debt will rank equally with all other External In
1
debtedness and will be payable as such." 3
There was no systematic pattern discernible in the data such as more
creditworthy countries picking a certain clause and less creditworthy ones
picking a different clause. The lack of a pattern is consistent with the view
that the differences are more idiosyncratic than due to any purposeful intent
to change the pari passu clause to favor (or disfavor) holdouts. A court at
tempting to read meaning into such differences runs a risk of misinterpreting
the clause.
As a follow-up to our quantitative examination of pari passu clauses in
sovereign bond covenants, we conducted over fifty in-depth interviews with

27.
See Anna Gelpem, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53
EMORY L.J. 1115, 1133 n.59 (2004) (describing the settlement in the Red Mountain case); see also
Hagan, supra note 21, at 315 nn.48-50.
28.
See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 15 (discussing the pre-Argentine cases); see also
Gelpem, supra note 26 (discussing the Argentine litigation over pari passu); Salmon, supra note 22
(making the point that the interpretive issue remains unresolved even after years of litigation).
29.

See Choi & Gulati, supra note 12.

30.

See id.

The importance, in light of the Elliott case, of these small differences in language is
31.
discussed at length in the recently released report of elite English lawyers on the matter. See FMLC
REPORT, supra note.16, at 19 (describing the differences in pari passu language for Estonia, Croatia,
and the Philippines).
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2
market participants.3 Among our interviewees were prominent attorneys at
the law firms most involved with sovereign debt deals, either as issuer's or
underwriter's counsel. Market participants uniformly confirmed what the
quantitative data suggested: the different versions of the clause do not repre
sent any conscious attempt to vary the pari passu clause.
2. R esponsiveness to Shocks
For the twenty countries for whom data was available for over at least
ten issuances during the 1985-2005 period, we found no response to the
Elliott Associates v. Peru litigation in terms of changes in the language of
contracts subsequent to the Elliott decision. Nor was there any response to
any of the later pari passu litigations that followed. While variations existed
between different countries, no variation existed across bond deals for the
same sovereign. We attempted to discern why not through our interviews.
The standard initial response was that it was clear to all that the Elliott
decision was an aberration. Most lawyers explained that they were confident
that no New York court would accept the interpretation that Elliott Associates
was pushing. We pushed these lawyers on their argument by pointing out the
fact that while the "aberrant" Elliott reading of the clause had found sympa
thy with multiple courts, including some federal courts in the U.S., the so
called "sensible" reading had not found favor anywhere as yet.33
The lawyers who found our first set of quibbles legitimate typically
came up with a second explanation, telling us that any change in the lan
guage of the new contracts would run the risk that a court would read the
modification of the language to mean that while the new contracts meant
something new, the holdouts were correct in their interpretation of the old
contracts.34
But why was it not just as likely, we asked, if not more likely, that a
court would interpret a change in the contract language in response to the
interpretive shock as a sign of the market's disapproval for the interpretive
shock? At this point, we received the most meaningful responses. The law
yers explained that it was impossible for standard-form clauses that were
32. Thirty-five of these interviews were with lawyers who either are or were active players in
the sovereign debt market and included not only lawyers at private law firms, but also lawyers in the
official sector and at investment banks and hedge funds. We may have missed talking to a few of the
key players in the market, but we conservatively estimate that we spoke to over fifty percent of the
population of players who understand the pari passu debate. For details, see Choi & Gulati, supra
note 12.
33. Indeed, even when the matter finally came before a New York judge and the "sensible"
reading was supported by amicus briefs filed by the Federal Reserve, the Clearinghouse, and the
New York Fed, the judge still chose to duck the issue. See Salmon, supra note 22. The court decision
and the briefs are available on the Emerging Markets Traders Association website. See EMTA. org,
New Developments, at http://emta.org/ndevelop/ (last visited October 22, 2005).
34. The story resembles the tort tale regarding subsequent repairs, where repairs do not get
done because of the fear that the very fact of the repairs will be read as a sign that the earlier state of
matters was faulty. In response to the disincentive to engage in subsequent repairs, evidentiary rules
typically exclude subsequent repairs from being introduced as evidence of the tortfeasor's negli
gence. See, e.g. , FED. R. Evm. 407.
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present in every single sovereign debt instrument across the globe to change
every time there was an aberrant court decision. The issue was coordination.
As a practical matter, the individual lawyer proposing that his client alter a
term in response to some interpretive shock faces the possibility that no one
else will change their terms. And the market is unlikely to accept a non
standard term. Further, if the court sees that some parties change their terms
and others do not, parties will find it difficult to argue to the court that the
market is unambiguous in having an understanding different from that
which caused the interpretive shock. In sum, it may be in the individual cli
ent's interest to stick with the old term.
3. The Fonn that the Market's Response Eventually Took
The market eventually did provide a coordinated response to the 2000

Elliott decision as part of an overall litigation strategy but, importantly, not
in drafting a new set of contract terms clarifying the pari passu clause. In
the first few pari passu cases filed subsequently to the Elliott decision, there
was no coordinated response by the sovereign debt community. But by
2003, when the pari passu matter showed up in a New York court in the case
involving the Argentine restructuring, the sovereign debt community organ
ized itself to produce amicus briefs filed by the U.S. Treasury, the New York
5
Federal Reserve, and the Clearinghouse, all opposing the holdout position.3
Note that it is unusual for these institutions to take the step of filing an
amicus brief in a private contract disputes-the U.S. Treasury, as best we
6
know, had filed briefs on only two prior occasions in the sovereign context.3
As of September 2005, we are aware of no serious attempt to coordinate
a clarification of the pari passu clause in the contracts themselves. Instead,
the choice was made to coordinate over litigation strategy. The law firm that
had been litigating almost all the pari passu cases from the sovereign side,
Cleary Gottlieb, was also the law firm with the largest volume of business in
7
terms of advising new issuances.3 So, if any firm understood the kind of
problems that pari passu clause was causing and could engineer a coordi
nated shift in the clause's language, it was Cleary. Yet, even Cleary's clients
were not issuing new bonds with clearer language on the pari passu matter.

35.

See supra note 33.

For discussions of the Allied Bank case in 1985 and the Banco Do Brasil case in 1995,
36.
see Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Dec/awing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a
Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT L L. 253, 268-73 (2003). Our cynical
public choice perspective on the matter is that considerable political and financial muscle must have
been exerted by key private sector interests in pushing these institutions to step in.
'

37.

See Thom Weidlich, Cleary Gottlieb's Iraq Work Secures Place as Top Debt Adviser,
NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 7, 2005, available at LEXIS, ALLBBN; see also Stephen J. Choi &
G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds,
53 EMORY L.J. 929, 975 (2004) (observing that Cleary has the lion's share of the sovereign issuer
market).
BLOOMBERG
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4. Lessons from the Pari Passu Case
We take several lessons from the experience with the pari passu clause.
First, a single court attempting to interpret the meaning of a commercial
boilerplate term used in a single contract can generate long-lasting and dis
ruptive consequences for the rest of the market using the same boilerplate
term. As we discuss, the standard approach to contract interpretation magni
fies the costs to contracting parties from courts attempting to deal with
boilerplate.
Second, even in a market populated with sophisticated players and large
intermediary organizations, coordination in response to a court ruling may
take some time, three years in the case of the pari passu clause. Importantly,
the pari passu market did enjoy large intermediaries that internalized the
interests of significant subsets of the markets. Both attorney firms and un
derwriters stand in a position to encourage collective action. Evidence exists
that Cleary Gottlieb was instrumental in the move toward collective-action
8
clauses in the early twenty-first century.3 Yet despite the presence of such
intermediaries, coordination occurred only after delay.
Third, the coordinated market response may take many forms. In the
case of the pari passu clause, when a coordinated response came, it was in
the form of a litigation response and not in drafting a clearer set of terms.
The language of the pari passu clause in the new contracts being issued re
mained the same across a wide number of contracts. As we will argue later,
the presence of a prior court decision and ongoing litigation surrounding the
pari passu clause pushed market participants to respond through litigation
rather than a change in the language of the pari passu boilerplate term di
rectly. A shift in how courts approach interpreting boilerplate terms may
reduce the incentive of market groups to respond through litigation and in
crease the incentive to focus instead on clarifying the meaning of boilerplate
terms.
B. International Swap and Derivatives Associations
The derivatives markets for swaps use boilerplate contracts. With swaps,
rather than draft a swap contract from scratch, parties turn to both form
agreements and standardized definitions provided by the International Swap
3
and Derivatives Association ("ISDA"). 9 Standardized contracts also facili
tate trades in public markets-otherwise parties would spend large amounts
of time assessing the various non-standard terms in each traded swap con
tract. ISDA represents more than 625 member institutions from forty-seven
countries, including Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, and
other financial institutions as primary members, and Cravath, Swaine &
38.

See Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 375.

Kahan and Klausner cite ISDA and the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware state bar
39.
as instances of standard-setting organizations in the area of bond contracts. See Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics
of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 761-64 (1997).
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Moore, Dewey Ballantine, and other service providers as associate mem
bers. 40 ISDA membership also includes various end-users of derivative
instruments, such as Ford Motor Credit Company and General Electric
Capital Corporation, as subscriber members. '4
Swap contracts can last up to fifteen years. While parties typically nego
tiate over economic-related terms (such as the interest rate terms, the length
of the agreement, the fixed versus variable nature of the interest), often non
economic provisions are not discussed. These include clauses dealing with
events constituting default, representation and warranties, governing law and
jurisdiction, and other covenants. Parties leave these non-economic terms to
the ISDA standardized contract known as the ISDA Master Agreement. The
Master Agreement contains a series of boilerplate clauses for the non
economic provisions. ISDA describes its Master Agreement as follows:
"[M]arket participants developed the ISDA Master Agreement . . . which
would contain the 'non-economic' terms . . . leaving counterparties free to
negotiate only the 'economic' terms-that is, rate or price, notional amount,
2
maturity, collateral, and so on."4 ISDA also publishes a "User's Guide" to
the Master Agreement detailing the purpose and use of the I SDA Master
Agreement provisions as well as how the provisions differ from prior itera
tions of the Master Agreement.
Parties supplement the Master Agreement with the negotiated economic
provisions. Typically, parties document the economic terms in a "Confirma
tion" statement. Parties may include all the definitions for relevant terms
within the Confirmation itself (a "Long-Form Confirmation"). Alternatively,
parties may incorporate a separate set of standard definitions by reference in
the Confirmation (a "Short-Form Confirmation").
ISDA promulgates various sets of "Definitions" containing a glossary of
standardized terms to which contracting parties may refer in the Confirma
tion of economic terms. For example, in the 1999 ISDA Definitions, ISDA
specifies a set of floating rate indices and currency definitions. Parties nego
tiating an interest rate swap may simply refer to one of the ISDA indices
rather than define the indices from scratch in setting up a swap involving a
variable interest rate. ISDA frequently supplements the 1999 Definitions,
providing, among other things, definitions for new floating rate indices.
Several lessons emerge from the market for swap and derivative con
tracts. First, boilerplate terms provide benefits to market participants,
reducing the number of "deal" points on which negotiating parties must con
tract, thereby reducing contracting costs and speeding up transactions. In the

40.
See International Swaps and Derivatives Association Primary Membership List,
http://www.isda.org/membershipnist_of_primary.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) (providing a list of
Primary-level members).
41.
See International Swaps and Derivatives Association Subscriber Members, http://
www.isda.org/membershipflist_of_subscribers.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) (providing a list of
Subscriber-level members).
42.
Int'! Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions:
No. 28 Why Is Derivatives Documentation (Such as the ISDA Master Agreement) Important?,
http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#28 (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
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case of swaps and other derivatives, standardization makes possible after
market trading in these financial instruments.
Second, industry associations that represent the interests of all the major
participants in a sophisticated, commercial market, such as ISDA, can form.
Where contracting parties are sophisticated, an industry association must
include a variety of market participants to have effectiveness. If ISDA repre
sented only the interests of financial institutions in the United States when
providing standard-form contracts, few institutions outside the United States
would accept such contracts when dealing with the U.S. institutions.
Third, certain markets are capable of generating boilerplate contract
terms and providing detailed documentation of these terms. ISDA serves
this function for the swap and derivatives contracts market. ISDA provides
User's Guides and updates its contracts and definitional provisions to meet
the needs of the marketplace. In the case of the ISDA Master Agreement,
ISDA dictates the standardized form of how swap and derivative contracts
will take place. Individual parties may choose to modify this standard, but
the incentives are against modification. Doing so is costly, generates legal
uncertainty, and results in instruments that are less tradable on the secondary
market (where traders expect the ISDA Master Agreement to govern).
Fourth, the lack of any mandate that parties use the ISDA Master
Agreement and definitions has not hindered the use of such terms in the
marketplace. Parties use the terms and accompanying ISDA User's Guides
because of the value they derive from standardization. Moreover, parties are
clear when they use the IDSA Master Agreement or definitions. Parties will
explicitly incorporate the ISDA 2000 Definitions in Short-Form Confirma
tions containing the economic provisions of their agreement, for example.
Courts attempting to interpret the meaning of a swap agreement, as a result,
have clear guidance when they are dealing with an ISDA Master Agreement
or definitions.
Lastly, why don't we see more entities like ISDA in other markets?"3
There are a number of possible reasons:
Not all markets consist solely of sophisticated participants. Even where
sophisticated participants predominate, commonalities may not exist across
the range of participants in what parties desire to see in a contract. The buy
ers and suppliers of a particular raw input in an industry may have varying
preferences on the types of terms they wish to see in their contract. W here
variations exist, little gain may exist from drafting standardized terms.
Status quo is important. W here an industry already has standard-setting
entities, such as law firms with their own in-house boilerplate provisions,
the gain to establishing a centralized standard-setting entity such as ISDA is
reduced. In the sovereign bond market, for example, where there are but a
handful of lawyers with expertise about the meanings of boilerplate terms
and, as a result, have a lion's share of the business, these lawyers may have

This is not to say that entities like ISDA do not exist in other markets. Nonprofits, for
43.
example, play a role in developing boilerplate terms. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in
the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1 075 (2006).
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44
an incentive to resist moves toward a central standard setter. The emer
gence of bodies like ISDA, with their standard forms and their User's
Guides and Definitions of Terms eliminates much of the advantage that
these elite law firms might have otherwise had as a result of their in-house
knowledge. Conversely, resistance to centralized standard-setting organiza
tions may come from the smaller players in the market who fear that the
standard setter will get captured by the elites and the result will be private
lawmaking that systematically favors the elites.
The deference courts give to the intent and guidance of a standard setter
is important. Where courts ignore the standard setter, instead focusing on the
specific intent of the contracting parties themselves, the standard setter pro
vides little benefit beyond simply drafting the language of the boilerplate
term. On the other hand, where courts give more deference to guidance pro
vided by a standard setter on the meaning of boilerplate, as we propose later
in the Article, a greater benefit exists to the industry from establishing a cen
tralized standard-setting organization such as ISDA.
In concluding, it helps to look at what happened recently when an ambi
guity did arise in the ISDA documentation. The cases we discuss involve
swap contracts written on sovereign debt (in other words, involving many of
the same lawyers from the pari passu debate).
C. The Eternity Cases and the Meaning of "Restructuring"
For institutions that invest in sovereign debt, but are concerned about the
risk of default, the market provides swaps that hedge against default risk.
The relevant market here is a large one that has been growing quickly-it
grew from between $100 and $200 billion in 1996 to $4.8 trillion in 2004
45
and $6.5 trillion in 2005. The Eternity cases arose out of a series of swaps
46
that were written on Argentine debt. The events that would trigger the swap
contracts were defined under the title "Restructuring." Included in the defi
nition of "Restructuring," in addition to the traditional types of defaults, was
47
something called an "Obligation Exchange." Argentina formally defaulted
on its debt in December 2001. But prior to that, Argentina had attempted a
series of exchanges that it referred to as "voluntary exchanges" where it
swapped around $50 billion of its shorter term obligations for longer term

44. This is not to say that there won't be rent-acquisition opportunities for these same elite
lawyers to take control of the standard-setting process. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note I, at 598
(concluding that rent-seeking by interest groups can occur in expert advisory processes such as
those set up by the ALI).
45.
See James Warnot & Justin Williamson, ISDA Definitions Unclear, Says U.S. Court,
INT'L FIN. L. REv. Sept. 2004, at 27, 27. For full citations to the Eternity cases, see infra note 54.
46. The material in this subsection that tackles the Eternity cases is solely the responsibility
of coauthor Choi and does not represent the views of coauthor Gulati (who, although he did not take
on the project, was contacted by J.P. Morgan about being an expert on the matter).
47.

See Salmon, supra note 48, at 33.
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lower rates and better secured debt.48 At issue in the Eternity cases was
whether a "voluntary exchange" qualified as an "Obligation Exchange" and
thus triggered the default provision in the swap contracts.
The Argentine swap contracts explicitly adopt the ISDA definitions. Un
der the ISDA Master Agreement, Obligation Exchanges are defined as
"mandatory" exchanges imposed on the Argentine bondholders where any
one of a set of things occurred (including reductions in the principal amount
9
of the debt or the interest rate).4 This definition makes some sense in the
corporate context where the debtor and its creditors who are seeking to
avoid the costs of entering a formal Chapter 11 proceeding often use pre
50
packaged bankruptcies ("prepacks"). Once court approval for a prepack is
obtained, the terms of the prepack become mandatory on all the creditors,
including minority creditors who did not voluntarily accept the terms. But
there is no Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy equivalent for sovereigns and, therefore,
no prepacks either. The same kind of "mandatory" exchange cannot take
place-at least for sovereign bonds governed under New York law-where
unanimous consent of the bondholders is typically required for any reduc
5
tions in principal or interest amounts. 1
52
The ISDA definitions were designed with corporate debtors in mind.
Importing the ISDA definition relating to an "Obligation Exchange" into the
5
sovereign context resulted in ambiguity. 3 Contractual terms that Jack a clear
meaning are an invitation for some clever lawyer to say "I know what that
clause means. It means that you owe me $X million dollars." That is pre
cisely what happened in the case of the pari passu clause. In the Eternity
cases, some of those who had purchased swaps on Argentine debt that ex
pired prior to Argentina's formal default in December 200 1 , but after the
"voluntary" exchanges that took place in November, asserted that "manda
tory" included those exchanges achieved through economic coercion and
that Argentina's so-called "voluntary" exchanges were actually coercive and
therefore mandatory.54

48.
See id. ; see also Felix Salmon, Sovereign Market Awaits Court Verdicts, EUROMONEY,
May 2002, at 32, 32.
49.

See id.

50.

See id.

5 1 . The requirement of unanimous consent was the norm for sovereign bonds governed by
N.Y. law at the time the swaps at issue in the Eternity cases were entered into. That norm has since
changed, with typical N.Y. law sovereign bonds now requiring supermajority consent. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Statement of Under Secretary John B. Taylor Regarding the Deci
sions by Countries to Issue Bonds with Collective Action Clauses (Feb. 3, 2004), available at
www.treas.gov/press/releases/js 1 1 44.htm.
52.

See Salmon, supra note 48, at 32-33; see also B. GERARD DAGES ET AL., FED. RESERVE
N.Y., AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGING MARKET CREDIT DERIVATIVES M A R KET (2005),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs22fedny4.pdf.
BANK OF

53.

See Salmon, supra note 48.

54.
See Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. , 375 F.3d 168,
1 82 (2d Cir. 2004); Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., No. 02
Civ. 1 3 1 2(LMM)(GWG), 2003 WL 2 1 305355 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2003); Eternity Global Master Fund
Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 1 3 1 2(LMM), 2002 WL 3 1 4263 1 0 (S.D.N.Y.
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Our interest is not in the outcomes of these cases or in the validity of the
arguments. It is in how ISDA reacted to the ambiguity and how the courts
used the ISDA materials as sources of authority. On the matter of the ISDA
reaction, even before the Second Circuit tackled the case in 2004 (the first
district court opinion came down in late 2002 and the second one in mid2003), ISDA moved to delete "Obligation Exchanges" from the definition of
55
a "Restructuring " in its revised 2003 Definitions. In addition a committee
was formed to tackle the question of what should be done to deal with the
56
special problems of derivatives drawn on sovereign debt contracts. An ex
pert group of elite sovereign debt lawyers was formed soon after the
Eternity litigation came about and that committee produced a report with
recommendations to ISDA. ISDA then acted within a matter of months.
The contrast with the pari passu case is striking, since at least some of
the same expert sovereign debt lawyers involved in that pari passu litigation
participated in the ISDA revision process. The same lawyers who took years
to respond to litigation or other interpretive shocks in the absence of a cen
tralized standard setter, responded extremely quickly when there existed an
effective standard-setting body such as ISDA to work through. With ISDA,
the response was immediate. The presence of ISDA ensured a mechanism
for coordination and prompt response-a point that finds support in other
57
examples of prompt ISDA responses to documentation problems. In the
pari passu case, although there was discussion about the need to form an
expert committee and produce a report, there was no committee formed and
58
the uncertainty remains unresolved five years later; moreover, sovereign
debt contracts as of this writing still all contain the same unclear pari passu
language. Significantly, the pari passu and Eternity contract ambiguities
were not isolated cases. They were arguably the two biggest contractual am
biguities that the sovereign debt market has had to deal with in fifty years.

Oct. 29, 2002). In addition to the Eternity litigations, there were three other cases involving the same
set of circumstances. See Warnot & Williamson, supra note 45, at 28-29 (reporting on these cases);
Salmon, supra note 48.
55. See Salmon, supra note 48; see also DAGES ET AL., supra note 52 (discussing revisions in
the 2003 Definitions that were made to counter the problems that the Argentine default and the
resulting swap disputes revealed).
56.

See Salmon, supra note 48.

The ISDA 1999 Definition of a Restructuring itself was a response to the ambiguities that
57.
the 1998 Russian default revealed-such as whether the Russian domestic debt "reinvestment"
program constituted a restructuring, whether it was material, how deliverable obligations should be
valued, and which obligations were covered. See DAGES ET AL., supra note 52.
58. See Letter from Charles H. Dallara, Managing Dir., Inst. of Int'I Fin., to Gordon Brown,
Chairman, lnt'I Monetary & Fin. Comm., (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.iif.com/data/
public/icdc0402.pdf (discussing the need to set up an expert committee to tackle the ambiguity and
uncertainty caused by the Elliott Associates v. Peru litigation). In England, thanks to the coordinat
ing efforts of the Bank of England, an expert committee finally came out with a report earlier this
year (2005). See FMLC RE PORT, supra note 1 6. In the United States, however, the coordination of
such an effort has proved difficult. On the unresolved state of the pari passu debate, see Salmon,
supra note 22.
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PROBLEM WITH B OILERPLATE

In sophisticated markets, conventional wisdom holds that the standard
ized nature of these contracts means that everyone (that is, "the market")
understands them. The terms in these contracts are the ones that the market
has determined as optimal, hence their widespread adoption. Interpretation
(and pricing) is easy because there is only one set of terms, and everyone
understands what these terms mean. Even if courts make mistakes in inter
59
pretation, the story goes, the market will contract around those mistakes.
We contend that the interpretation of boilerplate terms in these contracts is
nowhere near as easy as one might think.
A. Traditional Contract Interpretation
Courts follow certain precisely defined "canons" of contract interpreta
tion. In assessing these canons as applied to boilerplate terms, we assume
that the goal of contract interpretation is to minimize the transaction costs
w
facing contracting parties. Judge Posner sets forth two types of costs that
make up the overall transaction cost: "drafting-stage costs" and "litigation
61
stage costs." While drafting-stage costs are always incurred, the litigation
stage costs "must be discounted, that is multiplied, by the probability of a
62
legal dispute."
Under standard canons of contract interpretation, courts first attempt to
discern the intent of the parties (the meeting of the minds) from the lan
guage of the contract. Second, if actual intent is obscure, courts will tum to
the course of dealings and course of performance between the contracting
parties in an attempt to indirectly determine intent. Courts will sometimes
use course of dealings or course of performance between a set of parties to
trump even explicit terms in the contract.63 Third, courts will look to indus
try custom and practice. Lastly, courts will examine the Uniform

59.
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 1588 ("[S]ince the judicial gap-filling contract rules are
only gap fillers, the parties can negate such a rule by expressly rejecting it in their contract. In other
words, unlike many other legal rules, gap-filling rules for contract cases are subject to the discipline
of the market.").
60. Posner states that the goal of contract interpretation should be to minimize overall con
tracting transaction costs. See id. at 1 583. Minimizing transaction costs will, in turn, allow more
transactions that increase the joint welfare of the contracting parties to go forward. Positive accounts
exist on the efficiency of contract law. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incom
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 9 1 -94 ( 1 989). We note,
without jumping into the debate, that no one theory, whether based on autonomy or economic effi
ciency, has succeeded either in positively describing contract law or setting forth a consistent norm
for contract law to follow. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three
Decades: Success or Failure?, 1 1 2 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003).
61.

Posner, supra note 3 , at 1 584.

62.

Id.

63. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U.
CHI. L . REv. 7 8 1 , 787 ( 1 999) ("[P]erhaps surprisingly, if a past practice is in conflict with an ex
plicit contractual provision, the past practice will often be allowed to vary and trump the express
terms." (citing U.C.C. § 2-208(3))).
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Commercial Code for a specifically applicable term, if any. For example,
UCC § 2-304 provides that the price in contract may be payable by money,
goods, realty, or otherwise. Importantly, the process of contract interpreta
tion flows from evidence specific to the parties outward to more general and
64
contextual sources of contract meaning.
Several costs exist in applying standard contract interpretation tech
niques to boilerplate that exceed the typical transaction costs for a non
boilerplate contract, as we discuss below.

1. Textual Analysis
The first interpretive method that a court is likely to apply is textual
analysis, looking at the language of the contract. Formalists would have
courts stop at the text itself as the sole source of interpretive authority, ap
plying tie-breaking rules where the text is ambiguous. Further, formalists
view all clauses in the contract as dated as of the time that the contract was
signed. Such a hard ex post approach will lead contracting parties (and tracie
associations and other aggregating institutions) to provide standardized
terms and standardized understandings to the market, increasing the cer
tainty of contracts and ultimately decreasing dispute and litigation-related
costs. The approach also results in greater upfront drafting costs. High up
front costs are justified where the alternative, greater expected litigation
costs, would be even higher. For example, where judges are life-time bu
reaucrats, lack practical business experience, and are likely to generate
error-prone interpretations of contract terms, the argument for a formalistic
65
approach to minimize inexpert judge error costs takes on significance.
The nature of boilerplate terms suggests that looking to the text of the
contract alone is problematic. The point of using a boilerplate clause is to
invoke, along with the language of the clause, all of the historical context
and learning that comes with it. Otherwise, the parties could simply custom
ize a clause that captures their particular understandings. Focusing on solely
the text may miss particular nuances of language deriving out of this histori
cal context leading to court errors of interpretation and greater uncertainty
for contracting parties. Consider the following two examples of potential
court error that may arise from applying solely textual analysis in analyzing
the meaning of boilerplate clauses.

64. We are oversimplifying somewhat in the text. As noted earlier, the U.C.C. itself complicated
the hierarchy we describe in the text in that it seems to accord importance to evidence from trade usage,
course of dealing, and performance even where the terms of the contract itself are perfectly clear and
are "integrated." See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 26 1 , 274-76 ( 1 985).
65.

See Posner, supra note 3 , at 1 583.
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a. Conflicting Boilerplate Clauses
The following two clauses appeared in at least a half dozen issuances of
66
sovereign debt by Mexico during the 2003-2005 period. The first clause is
the Mexican collective-action clause ("CAC") governing changes in pay
ment related terms. In March of 2003, Mexico was the first of the big
sovereign borrowers to move from unanimity action clauses ("UACs") to
67
CACs. Mexico's CAC clause became the model for practically every other
68
sovereign borrower seeking to issue bonds in the New York market. This
clause became one of the most discussed and carefully scrutinized contract
6
clauses in the history of the world financial markets. 9 The clause70 states
that 75% or more of the creditors (in aggregate principal amount) on a par
ticular bond instrument can agree to modify the payment terms of the
71
instrument.
When Mexico made its shift to CACs, it had to make all sorts of public
disclosures to its investors in its road shows and press conferences to pro
72
mote the offering and in the text of its prospectus supplements. In the
contract itself though, on the page following the page where the new 75%
CAC-modification clause appeared was an "Obligation Absolute" clause.73
The Obligation Absolute clause provided that "no provision of this Note or
of the Fiscal Agency Agreement shall alter or impair the obligation, which is
absolute and unconditional, to pay principal of and any premium, if any, and
74
interest on this Note."
These two clauses seem both clear and in contradiction with one an
other. Traditional contract analysis would take the view that it makes little
sense that the parties would include these two contradictory provisions. So,
66.
See the ''Tenns and Conditions" section in the Sub-Authorization Certificates for issuances
dated Mar. 3, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 0 1 368/000090342303000227/urns 1 8ka_
02-28.txt; June 10, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101 368/0000903423030005 1 5/ums 1 8
kaex1_06- 1 0.txt; Nov. 19, 2003 (AuthorizationCertificate), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/
1 0 1 368/000 1 1 2528203006283/b328 1 93_ex9-e.htm; Jan. 13, 2004, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ edgar/
data/101368/0000950 1 2304000308/y93 1 95exv99wl .txt; Apr. 27, 2004, http://www.sec.gov/ Archives/
edgar/data/1 0 1 368/000095012304006039/y97209exv99wl .htm; Aug. 9, 2004, http://www. sec.gov/ Ar
chives/edgar/data/1 0 1 368/000095 01230400988 1/y00759exv99wl .htm; Nov. 22, 2004, http:// www.sec
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 0 1 368/00009 501 230401 4077/y69 1 2 1 exv99w l .htm; Jan. 7, 2005, http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l 0 1 368/000095012305000 1 63/ y04635a2ex v99w l .htm.
67.
See INT'L MONETARY FUND, COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AND ISSUES 20 (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/psi/2003/032503.pdf.
68.

See id.

69.
See Anna Gelpem, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., May 2003, at 1 9, 19; see also ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 2 1 , ch. 8.
70.
United Mexican States, Form 1 8-K/A, at Ex. 2, cl. 1 1 (Mar. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 0 1 368/000090342303000227/ums 1 8ka_02-28 . txt.
71.
See United Mexican States, Prospectus [Rule 424(b)(3)], at I (Dec. I, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 1 0 1 368/000090342303000995/ums-424b_1 202.txt.
72.
The prospectus for Mexico, for example, states on the cover page that these particular
issuances are governed by CACs and not the traditional UACs. Id.
73.

United Mexican States, Form 1 8-K/A, supra note 70, at Ex. 2, cl. 1 4.

74.

Id.
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proceeding on the assumption that rational parties would not include contra
75
dictory provisions, the court would try to reconcile the two provisions. And
if that were not possible, the provisions would knock each other out. The
end result: confusion and a greater likelihood of court error.
To the extent that contracts with boilerplate pull from different clauses
from varying historical sources, a "Frankenstein" contract may result. Taking
a boilerplate analysis that looks to the histories of the clauses can help inter
pret these Frankenstein contracts. In the case of Mexico's bond covenants, a
historical analysis would reveal that one of the clauses (Obligation Abso
lute) was older and a relic of when sovereign bond contracts used unanimity
language similar to that used in domestic corporate bonds. The same analy
sis would reveal that the other c lause (CAC) is of recent vintage and
intended to trump the unanimity language. While attorneys succeeded in
removing the most explicit language about unanimity, they neglected to re
move additional clauses that also reflected the unanimity sentiment. Once
this inadvertence is recognized, the need to place greater weight on the more
recent vintage collective-action clause becomes clear.
b. Treating Small Differences in Language as Deeply Meaningful
In our pari passu case study, we reported that the pari passu language
for every sovereign was not the same. 76 Instead, there are small differences
in the language; our data revealed at least twelve different versions of this
77
so-called standard clause. We saw, for example, that while the most stan-

7 5.
Even a brief examination of the case law will reveal that courts are skilled at reconciling
seemingly inconsistent provisions, whether they be i n statutes or contracts, explicit or implicit. See
Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 285 ("[T]here is almost always some contextual argument upon
which seemingly inconsistent terms can be rationalized.").
76.

See Choi & Gulati, supra note 1 2 .

Among the versions of the pari passu clause in our database were the following dozen
77.
(references are to the issuer, quantity, type of offering, and date of the offering):
"The debt securities . . . will rank at least pari passu without any preference among them
selves. The payment obligations . . . will at all times rank at least equally with all other
payment obligations of Jamaica." Jamaica, $300 million, Registered Offering, dated
5125105.
"[The debt securities] . . . will rank equal in right of payment among themselves and with
all of Mexico's existing and future unsecured and unsubordinated public external indebt
edness." Mexico, $1 billion, Registered Offering, $ 1 billion, 1 14105.

�

"The notes will rank pari passu with all other unsecu
Indebtedness of the Issuer." Por
tugal (U.S. law), $ 2billion, Registered Offering, 7/26/05.
"The obligations under the Bonds . . . will rank at all times at least pari passu in all re
spects with all other present and future outstanding unsecured indebtedness issued,
created, or assumed by Portugal ." Portugal (German Law), OM 1 .5 billion, Bearer
Bonds, 7/2/93.
"The bonds shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves."
Russia, $2 billion, Private Offering, 6124/97.
"[The bonds] will rank equal in right of payment among themselves and with all of Uru
guay's existing and future unsecured and unsubordinated foreign debt as defined (under
the Negative Pledge) below." Uruguay, $250 million, Registered Offering, 3/20/02.
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dard articulation of the clause was that the sovereign's debt would "rank

pari passu in priority" with all other unsubordinated debt of the sovereign,
there are clauses, such as that of Italy, that are more specific and say that the
sovereign's debt will "rank pari passu in priority and will be payable as
78
such." Applying traditional contract analysis where we assume that the
parties intend these small differentials in wording to have significance, we
would treat the Italian clause as different from the more standard one. And
the commentators who have compared the Italian pari passu clause to the
others precisely predict this result: that the Italian clause is going to be
79
treated differently.
But take a boilerplate analysis. Let us say that the Italian version of the
clause is some historical relic from well before the Elliott Associates v. Peru
case. Lawyers around the world have slightly different phraseology in their
contracts, but they are all trying to do the same thing. And that is to invoke
the historical understandings of the clause. They are not trying to set forth a
customized version of their own clause that is independent of the historical
understandings. Changes may occur to clauses deriving from the same
original boilerplate, not out of a deliberate attempt to c hange the meaning of
the term but rather due to stylistic preferences of a particular attorney or
"The Debt Securities . . . will rank equally . . . Amounts payable in respect of principal
and interest . . . will be charged upon and be payable out of the State Revenue Account
of the South African Government . . . equally and ratably with all other amounts so
charged and amounts." South Africa. $1 billion, Registered Offering, 5/24/04.
"[The bonds r]ank at least equally in right of payment with all of the Philippines' other
unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness." Philippines, $ 1 .5 billion, Regis
tered Offering, 1 /26/05.
"The bonds . . . shall at all times rank pari passu and without any preference among
themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic shall . . . at all times rank at least
equally with all its other payment obligations relating to External Public Debt." Vene
zuela, $ 1 .5 billion, Registered Offering, 4/2 1 /05.
"The Notes . . . rank and . . . will rank at least pari passu with all other, subject to Condi
tion 3 (Negative Pledge), unsecured Indebtedness of the Republic other than any
Indebtedness preferred by Lebanese Law." Lebanon, $400 million, Private Offering,
51610 1 .
"The payment obligations of Israel under the bonds will at all times rank at least equally
with all other payment obligations of Israel relating to unsecured, unsubordinated exter
nal indebtedness." Israel, $500 million, Registered Offering, 517105 .
"They will rank equally with all of our present and future unsecured and unsubordinated
general borrowing . . . . We will pay amounts due on the debt securities equally and rata
bly with all general loan obligations of Italy." Italy, $4 billion, Registered Offering,
1/1 3/05.
Choi & Gulati, supra note 1 2.
B ased on our interviews, we are fairly certain that the Italian clauses were not drafted
78.
with the goal of favoring the holdout creditors. Rather, Italy's advisers assumed that they had much
the same clauses as did every other sovereign borrower. In the wake of the Elliott case, however, the
Emerging Markets Creditors Association did consciously draft a pari passu clause that favored the
holdouts' interpretation. See Michael M. Chamberlin, A Casual Observer's Commentary on the
Taylor Proposal and EMCA's Model Covenants for New Sovereign Debt Issues (5/3/02 draft), (Aug.
9, 2002) (draft manuscript), available at http://www.emcreditors.com/pdf/n_Chamberlin_on
_covs.pdf. As best we know, the EMCA clauses were not adopted by any sovereign.

79.

See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 1 5 .
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even transcription errors. If the reason for a particular piece of language is to
invoke historical understandings, as opposed to setting out a customized
statement of intent, then it is not at all clear that the small differences in lan
guage, such as that between Italy and the other sovereigns, should be given
much weight at all. Italy's lawyers likely were trying to invoke the same
history that the lawyers for Belize and Argentina and Peru were invoking,
each with their slightly different clauses.
One might ask how a court is to distinguish between a historical invoca
tion and a special customized clause. The answer has to do with the nature
of boilerplate. If Italy was trying to adopt a customized understanding for
these parties, then we would see that specified in the prospectus and flagged
prominently. But, instead, if we see that this same clause has been there ever
since the first Italian contract was negotiated and is phrased in a particular
way largely because Italy's lawyers did not foresee the Elliott Associates v.
Peru case, then we should treat it similarly with other boilerplate clauses
deriving out of the same historical tradition. With boilerplate, small differ
ences in language should not be treated as having great meaning. The
market does not price these differences as meaningful, the lawyers do not
understand them as such (mostly, they do not even notice them), and the
only people with an incentive to push these differences are the litigators rep
resenting typical holdout investors seeking to maximize their short-term, ex
post position.
c. What About the Penalty Default Approach

in the Foregoing Two Cases?
Court mistakes due to a formalist approach may act like a penalty de
fault, forcing contracting parties to write better-specified contracts with
80
fewer ambiguous terms. Penalty defaults in the context of boilerplate
terms, however, are unlikely to reduce overall transaction costs. First, be
cause the actual contracting parties did not draft the boilerplate provision
(and likely do not even understand the meaning of the boilerplate terms),
imposing a penalty interpretation approach may not result in many of the
parties changing their contracting behavior. To go back to the pari passu
case study, what the court did in Elliott Associates v. Peru, in taking a strict
textualist view, was to impose a penalty on the market for its failure to pro
vide clarity. We have seen from not only the cost to Peru, but the cost in
subsequent litigations (not to say anything of the uncertainties created), that
the penalty was substantial. Yet, the market was unable to respond by pro
viding greater clarity in its contracts. Instead, the pari passu study suggests
that parties will sometimes endure the cost of greater court errors, reducing
the overall surplus from contracting behavior.
Second, a penalty default approach may lead some parties to pay closer
attention to which boilerplate terms they select. Parties will be uncertain
80. On penalty defaults in contract law, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contrac
tual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, I 0 1 YALE L.J. 729, 757 ( 1 992).
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whether relying on a particular boilerplate will in fact avoid the penalty. The
specter of the penalty, in the form of court errors, will lead parties to expend
costly resources in assessing the boilerplate term, eliminating most of the
cost savings from using boilerplate in the first place. For those parties that
choose to eschew a boilerplate term and draft their own term, higher costs
are incurred. Parties desire boilerplate terms as private-market contractual
gap-fillers for terms over which the parties do not wish to negotiate. It is
therefore dubious whether it is socially desirable to get the actual contract
ing parties to focus more on the boilerplate terms at the time of contracting.
For boilerplate terms, even courts that fear they lack expertise to handle
ambiguous boilerplate terms may tum, under our approach, to the intent of
the original drafters, a source of expertise that will minimize the court error
in dealing with boilerplate terms. Once parties start introducing
non-boilerplate provisions, courts will lack a centralized authority to which
81
to tum, leading to more frequent court errors.
2. Contextual Analysis

The usual alternative to textual formalist analysis is contextual analy
82
sis. The context that one looks to in contract interpretation is that
surrounding the parties in dispute (course of dealing) and, beyond that, in
dustry custom and trade usage. Here, neither is likely to give one much help
due to (a) idiosyncratic contracting parties who do not represent the interests

8 1 . Why should sophisticated, commercial parties care about court errors? Alan Schwartz
and Robert Scott argue that business parties will not care about variance in court interpretation. See
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1 , at 576-77. Higher variance in interpretation leads to more errors.
Such errors, assuming courts get the interpretations correct on average, means that a party will
sometimes benefit and sometimes lose based on any one error. But on average, according to
Schwartz and Scott, these errors will even out. Business parties that are risk-neutral will, thus, not
care about the errors. In the case of boilerplate terms, we disagree with the Schwartz and Scott view
on court errors. Litigation over forgotten meanings is likely to be one-sided because it is only parties
with short-term interests who will push aggressively for meanings that are inconsistent with the
long-term interests of the majority of players. Often there is some initial starting point of under
standing for what the boilerplate terms mean (or at least what the terms do not mean). Consider
again the pari passu clause. Many believed that the pari passu clause did not prevent a sovereign
from giving preferential payments to a particular creditor, or perhaps more accurately, never gave
any thought to the pari passu clause at all prior to the Elliot litigation. Preferential payments to the
IMF and other international organizations were common when a sovereign was in distress and bond
prices reflected this practice ex ante. One can therefore see the large cost to sovereigns if the clause
is interpreted instead to forbid preferential payouts (to the IMF for example). The sovereigns will
not be able to obtain new financing and the country's welfare will fall as a result (or, in the alterna
tive, the sovereign will have to pay off the holdout creditors with a hefty premium). On the other
hand, it is unclear what the cost to the holdout creditors is if the clause is interpreted not to forbid
preferential payouts since the price they paid already took this into account. Court errors that deviate
from the understandings of the majority of participants in the market, therefore, may create dramatic
and asymmetric shifts in wealth among contracting parties. The magnitude of court errors may also
be quite large. Consider the interpretive battles over the meaning of the pari passu clause in the
sovereign bond context. As the Argentine l itigation illustrated vividly, literally billions of dollars
turned on how the clause was interpreted. Collective-action problems among participants exacerbate
these error costs. Where errors of interpretation take place infrequently but with large magnitude,
even sophisticated commercial parties may not take a risk-neutral attitude to such errors.
82.

See id. at 572 (describing the contextual approach to contract interpretation).
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of the group of contracting parties in the industry that may rely on a particu
lar boilerplate term, and (b) the paradox of efficiency for boilerplate terms
that may undermine the ability of courts to rely on industry custom.
a. Idiosyncratic Contracting Parties
In the boilerplate context, a focus on the needs of the specific parties be
fore the court may adversely impact the welfare of other contracting parties.
An interpretation that increases value for the specific parties may reduce
83
overall value for the maj ority of other parties using the same term.
Even where the specific parties before the court are not systematically
different from others, the resources of the specific parties are unlikely to
match the resources of the group of all contracting parties. Once a dispute
arrives at court, there will exist at least two opposing opinions on how the
court should interpret a particular boilerplate term. How well a particular
position is viewed by the court will depend in part on resources and abilities
of the particular party pushing the position before the court. Other interested
parties can submit amicus briefs to the court, but their influence will likely
be less than that of a litigant before the court.
Providing clarity to boilerplate terms, made incomplete with the vaga
ries of time, through litigation as opposed to a more collaborative process
incorporating interests across all contracting parties can lead to skewed in
terpretations. Litigation is inherently adversarial. Only two out of many
possible positions get full vetting before the court. Parties in litigation have
few dimensions along which they may trade to broker compromises.
Parties in litigation may also place too much weight on their particular
ex post situation compared with the overall future benefit of the pool of all
contracting parties. For example, an employee, once in litigation, may argue
against broadly interpreting a boilerplate term prohibiting the employee
from engaging in related work activities after leaving the employer. Em
ployees generally, however, may favor such a term at the time they enter into
such contracts to the extent they result in higher wages. One saw something to
this effect happen in the Elliott Associates v. Peru case, where Peru settled
with Elliott based on an ex parte decision interpreting the pari passu clause. It
was in the political interests of Peru's government to not be seen as defaulting
83.
Stewart Macaulay kindly pointed out to us that our cost calculus might have to change in
circumstances where the deal in question was one that evolved as a function of the relationship. For
example, take a construction project where evolving circumstances idiosyncratic to the particular
project-such as unduly soft soil calling for stronger foundations-might alter the relationship.
There, looking to the "real deal", as captured by the pattern of conduct of the parties and industry
custom, might be important even where parties were using standard boilerplate contracts. In the
examples from the sovereign bond and derivatives industries that we use though, there is very little
room for interaction among the contracting parties after the original deal. The "real deal" is the
original "paper deal". The only problem is that sometimes parties do not know what the "paper
deal" is. What we do know though is that parties intend to enter into the standard deal, under the
standard contract, that everyone else is entering into. On the distinction between "real" and "paper"
deals, see Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships,
Complexity, and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT 3,
5 1 -102 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003).
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on its Brady bonds (the Fujimori government was on its last legs). But the
cost of leaving the Brussels interpretation unchallenged produced a signifi
cant amount of uncertainty for the rest of the market.
Focusing on the intent of the specific contracting parties also invites
strategic behavior. A party unhappy with how a contract turns out may argue
to a court that the contract in fact means something different according to
the "private" course of dealings and understandings between the contracting
parties. Where few objective indicia exist on this "private" meaning, courts
will have difficulty in distinguishing between situations where the parties
agreed ex ante to vary the contract with situations where one party ex post
84
simply makes such a claim to nullify an unfavorable contract.
b. Industry Custom
When standardized terms are first drafted, the original drafting parties
will know what the terms mean, what contingencies the terms are supposed
to address, and how different terms relate to one another (for example, in
case of conflict, which term trumps). Although the scholarship on the proc
esses that lead to the emergence of standardized terms is limited, we know
that even the most sophisticated markets generally take time before they can
coordinate and agree to adopt a new standard term. In other words, at the
point of adoption, there is likely to be maximal knowledge and understand
85
ing in the market about what the term was intended to mean. Just as
importantly, the original adopting parties will also have a sense of what con
tingencies their terms do not address.
As the standardized terms spread through numerous contracts, later con
tracting parties will often simply adopt the terms with the implicit
assumption that the terms (often coming as a package with other standard
ized terms) are "efficient." Why else would others use the terms? With the
passage of time, the assumption that the terms are efficient-while perhaps
justified at the time of the first use of the terms and the initial dispersion of
the terms throughout the marketplace-becomes more problematic. Market
participants, nonetheless, may cling to the assumption about efficiency for
extended periods of time. It bears emphasizing that a key assumption is that
this is a world where disputes over the meanings of provisions are rare.

84. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note I, at 585-86. Schwartz and Scott therefore advocate a
textualist approach to contract interpretation to prevent such "private" understandings from receiv
ing any interpretive weight unless explicitly included in the contract language at the time the
contract is entered into. See id. Our proposal, in contrast, gives no weight to the private understand
ings of the specific contracting parties and thus is less vulnerable to strategic behavior on the part of
any one set of contracting parties.
85. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 937; cf Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Cus
tom: Disentangling Informal Custom from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
82 1 , 824 ( 1 999) (noting, in his comment on Lisa Bernstein's article, supra note 1 8, the many years
it took the various trade associations to convert their industry customs into unified codes that then
often became standard contracts).
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The assumption of efficiency may lead contracting parties to expend few
s6
resources in discussing or investigating such boilerplate terms. Instead,
attorneys will uncritically include the terms in all their contracts. Paradoxi
cally, the assumption that the terms are efficient produces an equilibrium
where no one knows what the terms mean (and what contingencies are ad
dressed and not addressed by the terms), thereby calling into question
whether such terms in fact are efficient for the contracting parties.
By contrast, Goetz and Scott, in their 1985 article, portray market under
s7
standings of these terms as improving over time. Over time, the terms get
ss
used, resulting in the removal of errors, ambiguities, and incompleteness.
For such terms, the implication of this high level of understanding at which
the market eventually arrives is that the history of the term should be irrele
vant in contract interpretation. s9 Our Article, however, is about the standard
form terms that do not get frequently "used" in the sense of there being fre
quent and public disputes where divergent views are aired and common
understandings are cemented. There is an initial point in time when these
terms are generally agreed upon and inserted into standard-form contracts.
But then decades can go by without the terms being used, during which
market understandings can vanish. Where current market understandings are
absent, the history of the term becomes important in its interpretation. The
majority of terms in standard sovereign and corporate bond contracts are,
for example, reused without much notice or attention.
With clauses whose understandings have been forgotten, neither context
about the parties themselves nor current industry custom is likely to be use
ful. The context that needs to be unearthed is a different beast-it is
historical context. Moreover, even if courts are able to determine a current
industry custom, it is unclear how much weight to place on this custom. At
the time a term is drafted, all affected parties will pay relatively more atten
tion to the meaning of the term. In contrast, after the passage of time, not all
affected parties will pay as much attention to the term. Industry participants
will simply ignore most boilerplate terms. Any custom that exists, therefore,
90
is unlikely to represent the full array of interests in the industry.
86.
The classic articulation of the efficiency paradox comes from Grossman and Stiglitz,
who were demonstrating the circularity of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Their insight was
that the very assumption of efficiency meant that no one would have an incentive to look for arbi
trage opportunities (because embedded in the efficiency assumption is a no-arbitrage assumption).
But the market can only arrive at efficiency if market players look for arbitrages and eliminate them.
See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 393, 404 ( 1 980).
87. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 287; see also Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Prefer
entum: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1 105, 1 1 1 2 (asserting that the
understanding of terms improves over time).
88.

See Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 287.

89. Epstein, making the same assumption about perfect market understandings of standard
form terms, writes that "[t]hese provisions should be construed as written, wholly without reference
to the fractured history of their origins." Epstein, supra note 85, at 83 1 .
90. Likewise, i f courts are able to uncover a course o f dealings or performance between a
specific set of contracting parties, applying this to interpret a boilerplate term is problematic. Be-
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The problem with appealing to contemporaneous industry custom to as
sist in the interpretation of longstanding boilerplate terms is different from
the problems identified by Lisa Bernstein with relying on industry custom in
91
the U.C.C. context. Bernstein reports that in several commercial industries,
including the hay, textile, and silk industries, trade associations often failed
to come to a consensus in developing trade rules. While local customs ex
isted, there were often conflicts in understandings, and trade associations
92
frequently failed to put forward nationwide usages and meanings. And
93
when they did succeed, the process often took multiple decades. In a sense,
the context we are interested in is the half of the process that Bernstein does
not analyze. That is, what happens after industry custom gets reduced to a
94
standard-form provision and when it becomes a default rule. The issue that
motivates us is that the robust understanding of the standard-form provision
that may have taken the market years to develop can then get forgotten.
Just as Bernstein identifies disagreement over the meaning of custom in
the pre-standard-form-provision period, we find in our pari passu case (and
predict more generally) that disagreement over the meaning of that stan
dard-form contract can arise subsequently because the meaning that
everyone thinks they understand can then get lost in the sands of time. The
difference, for purposes of contract interpretation, between our situation and
that which Bernstein's paper addresses is the following: Unlike where trade
associations failed to establish nationwide customary meanings in an indus
try, the lack of any current industry customary meaning for boilerplate terms
due to the passage of time leaves courts with an important alternative source
of interpretive authority. As we argue later, courts may look to the historical
context of the term-that is, the point at which disagreements over custom
were settled and a standard-form provision arose-to determine the original
95
meaning of the drafters.
Bernstein also notes that many gaps in custom also relate to remote con
tingencies that trade associations and industry participants find too costly to
cause a b?ilerplate term is designed to cover an entire industry or trade, the specific course of deal
ings or performance among any idiosyncratic set of parties is unlikely to maximize the interests of
the industry or trade.
91.

See Bernstein, supra note 1 8.

92.
See id. at 7 1 7-46. Bernstein further emphasizes that the mid-to-late-nineteenth-century
and the early-twentieth-century industries which she examined were particularly conducive to the
development of national trade customs. See id. at 7 1 5 .
9 3 . For example, the National Hay Association took eleven years o r more t o decide o n the
definition of a contract carload. The National Grain and Feed Association took more than twenty
years to promulgate its Feed Trade Rules. And the textile trade took approximately eighteen years to
produce its Worth Street Rules. See id. at 7 19-20, 723 n.44, 7 25-29, 732; see also Epstein, supra
note 85, at 824 (citing Bernstein's evidence on this point).
94.
Richard Epstein's comment on Bernstein's article makes the distinction between the pre
standard-form period, where understandings of custom are in flux, and the post-standard-form pe
riod that Bernstein's article does not address. Epstein, supra note 85, at 824. Epstein though, seems
to assume that once custom morphs into a standard form, the understandings of what the standard
form term means will remain. Id.
95.
Once courts emphasize historical meaning, the original standard setters will have an
incentive to record and preserve the meaning behind boilerplate terms.
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96
address. Boilerplate terms, in contrast, do not present necessarily remote
contingencies. Ambiguity may arise even in maj or contingencies, such as
the interaction of the pari passu clause with the sovereigns' ability to make
preferential payments to the IMF and other world organizations, simply due
to the passage of time and the corresponding loss of meaning with time. For
widely prevalent boilerplate terms, finding a consistent and industry-wide
method of resolving interpretation issues, such as referring to the historical
context of terms, greatly affects the welfare of all contracting parties in the
industry.
B. Guessing at Welfare Maximization
If neither the textual nor the contextual approach yields answers, then a
third option is for the court to attempt a welfare-maximizing estimate for
what the parties must have wanted from the clause. This is what Judge Win
ter attempted in the Sharon Steel case, where he recognized that he was
dealing with boilerplate terms and the related need to defer to market under
97
standings with these types of terms.
Since there was no market
understanding readily available to him though, Winter simply estimated
what the two sides might have been looking for in negotiating this clause.
As with textual analysis, the court that attempts to divine a welfare
maximizing solution is misunderstanding the nature of boilerplate. The
value of the clause to the parties is in the historical context that it brings
with it. The parties may not know what that historical learning is, but they
use the clause because they want the benefit of history. In performing the
value-maximizing guess, the court is throwing away the historical context
and guessing at a solution, leading to a high possibility of error.
C. Dealing with Court Errors
Ill-advised attempts on the part of courts to interpret boilerplate terms
with standard contract interpretation techniques may result in a market re
sponse. The market can respond in two ways. First, it can reprice the
contracts for the new meaning that courts have provided. Second, it can re
vise the language in existing contracts to communicate to the courts that the
understanding that the parties have is different from the one that the courts
articulated. In theory, these market responses can ameliorate the costs of
court interpretation attempts. But there are reasons to expect that ameliora
tion will be minimal in practice.

96.
97.
1 982).

See Bernstein. supra note 1 8, at 747.
See Sharon Steel Corp.

v.

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1 039, 1 048 (2d Cir.
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D. Pricing Response
In theory, if parties understand a standard provision to mean X, but a
court reinterprets it to mean Y, the market price of all contracts will simply
98
adjust to take into account the new meaning. Even if this pricing adjust
ment does take place, there remains the problem that the parties wanted their
contract to mean X, not Y. So, with pari passu for example, neither the
debtor nor the majority of creditors likely wanted a contract provision that
would make it harder for the country to obtain emergency financing from
the IMF. In other words, the new interpretation was value-reducing for both
sides. Even with the possibility of a price response, uncertainty costs re
main. The fact that some local court in Brussels asserts an interpretation
does not make it universally accepted. This uncertainty can be priced, but
once again, it is a cost that the parties would prefer to avoid. In sum, a pric
ing response by the market still leaves the parties with significant costs.
E. Language-Clarification Response
If courts misinterpret some customized clause between parties, parties
can supposedly correct it because they know what they want their clause to
say. When the market responds through the creation of new terms more in
line with the market's understanding, all subsequent contracts will avoid the
negative effects of an ill-advised court interpretation. An immediate market
response may also help signal to other courts that the prior court's decision
99
was contrary to the market's understanding of that boilerplate term. Such a
response may cut off further litigation or at least ensure that future interpre
tations are closer to the market understandings.
If the market functioned well in responding to court interpretations of
boilerplate terms, the social cost of remaining with the present contract in
terpretation doctrine would be low. But with boilerplate clauses, dispersed
market participants may lack the ability to coordinate, at least initially, to
clarify the language in subsequently adopted terms. Market participants may
also hesitate to correct terms out of a fear that a scattered, non-unified at
tempt at clarification may increase the likelihood of further unfavorable
court rulings.
Scholars have observed that boilerplate contract terms display features
100
of network externalities. The more terms of a specific type that are used,

98.

See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 87, at 1 1 1 8 .

99.
One may wonder how a court is to determine when a market has in fact made a decided
shift in contract terms. Courts see only the subset of contracts that end up in litigation, a subset that
may not be representative of the group of all contract terms in use. Posner provides that
"[a]cademics can conduct the necessary inquiry into the negation rate." Posner, supra note 3, at
1 589. Running an academic study, however, can take years and academics often lack access to the
full range of contracts used in an industry or trade.
1 00.
See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow
of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 69 1 , 7 1 0 (2004); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 39, at
729-35; Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate law, and Networks of Contracts, 8 1 VA. L.
REV. 757, 774-75 ( 1 995).
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the greater is the likelihood that the term will receive court scrutiny and, as a
result, greater legal clarity in meaning. Attorneys are also more likely to
draft other terms complementary in operation with more common terms.
Other reasons for "sticky" contract terms exist. Contracting parties must
balance several goals in entering into a contract. Parties will desire terms
that maximize their return from the contract. Parties in certain contexts may
also care about the speed with which a deal is completed and the speed of
transactions will be higher, other things equal, if every transaction occurs
10
under the same uniform code that no single party can alter unilaterally. 1 In
the sovereign bond context, for example, speed matters in the placing of a
new bond issue. Sovereigns typically will issue new bond deals when inter
est rates are favorable and will not wish to delay out of a fear that the
interest rates may shift unfavorably.
Additionally, once the market comes to an equilibrium of quick deals,
any deal that results in a delay will result in investors searching for other
deals. Delay may result from information asymmetries. When a sovereign
proposes new, non-standard terms, delay may result as investors puzzle over
the new term (or simply jump ship to another deal). One side negotiating a
contract may not be sure of the motives of the other side or the penchant of
the other side to act litigious or difficult about the performance or interpreta
tion of contract terms into the future. Calling attention to a particular
boilerplate term may signal to the other side that one is perhaps acting op
portunistically or is potentially difficult to deal with. Rather then send such
a signal, parties may choose to leave a boilerplate term as-is, even if the
term is not optimal for the parties' situation. Keeping the contract terms
identical is important in the area of sovereign bond deals for this reason.
Any change will result in investors stopping a bond offering in its tracks to
investigate the reason for the change-anathema for issuers and underwrit
02
ers eager for quick placement of the offering debt securities. 1
Another market failure that may result in a lack of response to contrac
tual shocks is the dispersed nature of contracting parties in many industries.
Many sovereigns typically will seek to issue bonds through no more than a
single offering in any given year. Coordination among dispersed contracting
parties may be difficult. As discussed in the pari passu example, an individ
ual party negotiating a contract only internalizes the benefit from the
specific contract. The party will ignore the benefit to other contracting par
ties in various contexts from improving on a boilerplate term. The same lack
of coordination may result in a non-uniform response to a court ruling inter
preting any given boilerplate term. Rather than put forward a non-uniform
response (with unpredictable response on the part of future courts), parties
may simply choose not to change a boilerplate term. When coordination
does eventually take place, it may take place so long after the initial court

101.

See Epstein, supra note 85, at 827.

I 02. For discussions of this negative signaling effect as a cause of contract stickiness, see
Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forth
coming 2006).
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interpretive shock to the term that even a coordinated shift in the contract
term may fail to convince the court that the market originally had a different
understanding. As with the pari passu example, sophisticated parties may
therefore coordinate instead around litigation strategy, submitting amicus
briefs and publishing commentary to affect the public discourse, among
other tactics.
The market does not always respond to a court interpretive error with in
action. In at least one instance, involving an important corporate bond term,
the market did respond to an erroneous court interpretation. Bill Bratton
documents such a coordinated move to correct the language in bond con
tracts in the wake of the classic Fifth Circuit case of Broad v. Rockwell
International Corp. 103 The response, while faster than in the pari passu or
104
CAC cases, nonetheless took several years. Even with the possibility of a
market response, our point is that the present contract interpretation regime
works to retard such a response. An alternative regime that focused first on
the historical understandings of a term and accepted evidence from the
range of market participants on this understanding would not create the
same level of deterrence on market participants seeking to clarify terms in
subsequent contracts.
III. A T H EORY OF B OILERPLATE I NTERPRETATION
The fact that contracts, even those between sophisticated parties, are not
always complete, failing to take into account every contingency and leaving
ambiguities in language, has been long recognized. Parties may rationally
choose not to expend scarce resources in clarifying every possible term
when the possibility of a problem arising from the terms is low (and thus the
discounted cost with having to deal with any conflict in meaning of a term is
lower than the upfront cost of clarification at the time of contract drafting).
Standard interpretation doctrine allows courts to play a gap-filling role
and assess what the parties would have contracted had they considered the
situation. Courts also look to the course of dealings and performance as evi
dence of the intent of the specific set of contracting parties. Allowing courts
to fill contract gaps ex post allows parties to focus on the more important
provisions of their contracts ex ante, secure in the belief that even if a low
probability contingency does occur and they end up in a contractual dispute,
an impartial decisionmaker, the court, will ascertain a solution that provides
value to all the contracting parties. Where upfront contracting costs are high
and parties trust that courts will generally get things "right" in their gap
filling in the low probability event that a term will lead to litigation, parties
may rationally choose to leave terms ambiguous or unspecified (minimizing

1 03. 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (Sth Cir. 1 9 8 1 ) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1 98 1 ); see
William W. B ratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1 984 Wis. L. REV.
667, 687 n.75, 695 n.1 1 1 .
1 04.

Our evidence on this point is anecdotal.
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the combined upfront negotiation and drafting costs and discounted dispute
5
related costs associated with the contingency). 1 0
Where contracts are incomplete due to the high costs of drafting com
plete contracts, there is reason to be cautious when asking courts to resolve
ambiguities and engage in gap-filling for boilerplate terms used in sophisti
cated markets. The lack of any intent on the part of contracting parties with
respect to the boilerplate terms combined with the possibility that the spe
cific parties before a court may not be representative of the industry
heighten the risk of court error. Once a court error occurs, collective-action
problems, combined with a fear of how courts will interpret a disjointed,
non-uniform market response to a court interpretation of a boilerplate term,
may lead market participants to delay modifying the term, seeking instead to
mount a litigation strategy. Taking a formalist approach is unlikely to im
prove on matters. Even when courts refuse to look beyond the text and take
a hard line on ambiguous terms, specific contracting parties are unlikely to
want to negotiate over the boilerplate term (this is why they chose to use a
boilerplate term in the first place !) and even if they do so, may incur large
1 06
duplicative costs across the industry.
Our observation that boilerplate terms are not the product of any actual
meeting of the minds but instead are placed into contracts because such
terms are used in most contracts (and thus are standardized) and seem to
work (the paradox of efficiency) leads us to the contention that courts are
approaching contract interpretation in exactly the backward fashion. These
terms are not representations of the specific intent of the parties to the trans
action. They are more like incantations, where the parties, by invoking the
boilerplate language, avail themselves of the historical reasons for the sur
1 7
vival of these terms in generations of contracts. 0
Unlike the focus of much of contract law scholarship on discerning the
precise understanding of a particular set of contracting parties, courts should
embrace the possibility that a general understanding for boilerplate terms is
desirable. Interpretation should be akin to statutory interpretation---courts
focus first on unearthing the original intent of the drafters and the historical
context in which the terms were initially drafted. Taking a statutory ap
proach to boilerplate enables courts to tum to an alternative, more expert
source of interpretive authority, leading to a greater likelihood that the wel
fare of contracting parties will be maximized. Under such an interpretive
1 05 .

See Posner, supra note 3, at 1 583.

1 06.
Posner describes boilerplate terms as a private alternative to courts as "gap-fillers" for
areas in a contract that the contracting parties find too remote a contingency or unimportant to ex
pend valuable resources in negotiation. See Posner, supra note 3, at I 585.
1 07.
In their I985 article, Goetz and Scott also recognize that there will be certain terms
whose value is in that they are invocations (or "talismanic") that carry predefined legal meanings
that are not readily discemable from looking at the terms themselves (these can be terms like
"F.0.B", "C.I.F', and "as is"). Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 282-83, 300--0 1 . The difference
between our approach and that of Scott and Goetz, though, seems to be that they don't see the mean
ings of these terms getting forgotten over time. They recognize that there are certain express terms
that the parties choose that are invocations. But, in the world Scott and Goetz describe, the market
understands what these invocations are meant to connote. See id. at 282-83.
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approach, industry standard-setting entities are more likely to organize and
clarify existing boilerplate terms as well as draft new boilerplate terms for
unaddressed contingencies. A statutory approach to contract interpretation
also minimizes the influence of any one set of contract parties who happen
to litigate over the meaning of a boilerplate term, and places greater weight
on the industry-wide understanding. Treating boilerplate terms as statutes
for purposes of interpretation also will lead to fewer court errors and a
greater ability on the part of the market to correct for any errors that do oc1os
cur.
If courts follow a statutory approach to interpreting boilerplate terms, to
whom should courts look as the "legislative" body? Ideally, an industry as
sociation would exist that incorporated the viewpoints of all the relevant
players in the industry in every pronouncement and decision the industry
association made on the meaning of boilerplate terms. Under this ideal, a
court may simply defer completely to the interpretations of the industry
wide association. Such an all-aggregating industry association, however, is
unlikely to exist, at least with respect to every pronouncement and decision,
whether formal or informal, coming from the association. While the formal
promulgation of new terms are likely to represent the views of all member
groups, ordinary press releases and other communications from the group
not coming out of a formal deliberative process may not.
Given the lack of an ideal legislative body, in this Part we set forth our
proposal of how courts may implement a contract-as-statute approach to
contract interpretation for boilerplate terms in sophisticated contracting
situations. We would (A) allow parties to designate a standard-setting entity
as the "legislative body" for a particular set of boilerplate provisions in a
contract. Even if an ideal legislative body does not exist, courts may rely on
sophisticated commercial parties in negotiating a contract to designate an
entity that best serves the parties' joint interests.
Where parties do not designate a legislative standard setter, we (B) set
forth an alternative set of contract interpretation steps, starting with histori
cal evidence on the meaning of a boilerplate term and moving forward in
time toward the market's current understanding of the term. Importantly, we
focus the court's inquiry squarely on market-wide perceptions of the terms
and not on the intent of any specific set of contracting parties before the
court. We make the argument that an inquiry into the historical evidence and
the intent of the original drafters comes closest to determining how an ideal
legislative body would interpret a boilerplate term.
We then discuss (C) how a contract-as-statute approach to interpretation
will affect the incentives of standard-setting entities to form in an industry.
We lastly (D) examine how boilerplate terms change the nature of contracts
108. We do not mean to suggest that contract law should incorporate the entire debate over
statutory interpretation. Indeed, we recognize that there is a strain of statutory interpretation that
prescribes strict textualism and abhors historical inquiry into legislative intent. Our point instead is
to suggest that, at least in the boilerplate context, it is worth having the kinds of debates over textu
alism versus historical understandings versus contemporary understandings that take place ;n the
statutory context.
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from a single document, representing a meeting of the minds of a set of con
tracting parties, to a compilation of several different sources of authority
(consisting of varied boilerplate provisions drawn from different sources).
A. The Designated Legislative Body
What does it mean to view boilerplate terms more like statutes? First,
contracting parties should have the ability to designate a standard-setting
entity to provide a definitive source of interpretive authority for the contract.
Put differently, the presumption that the state (through its courts) stands at
the top of the interpretive hierarchy needs to be altered. 109 Even in the ab
sence of an ideal legislative body capable of incorporating the interests of all
relevant industry participants for any given decision, sophisticated contract
ing parties may find close alternatives. ISDA, for example, provides a close
approximation in the swaps and derivatives markets. Courts may use the
selection on the part of sophisticated parties of ISDA, or some other entity,
as their designated legislative entity as evidence of the parties' revealed be
lief that selecting the designated legislative entity to interpret future contract
ambiguities will result in fewer uncertainties and errors than relying on
court-based interpretation.
Such a designation would require courts to adopt the interpretation of
the designated standard setter, even if provided after the same court has in
terpreted the term differently in prior litigation, for terms that are part of
contracts negotiated in the past. This "legislative" designation would allow
the third party to revise constantly the meaning of boilerplate terms not only
for contracts negotiated in the future but also all previously negotiated con
tracts. The boilerplate term parts of contracts no longer would reflect a
particular snapshot of time but rather form a network of dynamic terms,
changing flexibly with the needs of the market or in reaction to ill-advised
court interpretations of boilerplate. When a court gets an interpretation of a
term incorrect, the designated legislative source could simply correct the
interpretation, affecting not only subsequent but all pre-existing contracts,
that we argue courts should take as conclusive.
Where the market has a pool of existing contracts containing boilerplate
tern1s, dealing with uncertainties in the terms (and correcting for court mis
takes in interpreting terms) is particularly difficult. Contract doctrine views
each contract as a separately negotiated meeting of the minds. Under this
view, even if parties subsequently decide to change a term's meaning for
subsequent contracts, there is no presumption (indeed there is a presumption
against) changing the meaning for prior, already negotiated contracts. Treat
ing each contract as a separate instrument for purposes of contract
interpretation is justifiable where each contract in fact does represent a new
meeting of the minds. But where specific terms are boilerplate and included
because the "market" requires them in a pool of contracts, the meeting-of109.
See also Schwartz & Scott, supra note I , at 568-69 (noting this presumption and also
arguing for it to be altered, albeit in a somewhat different context).
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the-minds rationale breaks down. Attempting to discern a specific intent can
introduce a degree of randomness into how boilerplate terms are interpreted,
leading to interpretive shocks such as the case of the pari passu clause.
Importantly, present contract law does not appear sympathetic to the
possibility of allowing parties to opt into a separate body of terms in a con
tract agreed to at a particular point in time that may change in the future
pursuant to actions taken by a third-party standard-setting body. This lack of
sympathy, we suspect, stems from the view that each contract represents a
meeting of the minds of the particular set of contracting parties at the time
1 10
when the contract is signed. Swap contracts that incorporate ISDA terms,
for example, incorporate only a snapshot of the ISDA terms current as of the
date of the contract itself. If ISDA changes its terms or definitions, these
changes only come into effect for subsequent contracts. Under this interpre
tive approach, similar boilerplate contracts in an industry take on a "wine" like character, with the meaning of different contracts dependent on the
"vintage" of the boilerplate terms to which they refer.
Providing a mechanism for market-based bodies to change the meaning
of standardized terms not only for subsequent contracts but also for the pool
of pre-existing contracts would give several benefits for contracting parties.
First, the risk of mistaken court interpretations is lessened. If a court pro
vides an interpretation of a boilerplate term that affects the entire market,
private standard-setting bodies may simply change the term for all pre
existing as well as subsequent contracts. Second, an expert industry associa
tion would have the ability to fine tune terms, correct prior mistakes in
drafting, and respond to changing market conditions. Parties ex ante that
realize the risk of misinterpretation is reduced may rely more on such boi
lerplate provisions and reduce any premiums for the reduced level of risk,
lowering overall contracting transactions costs. Our proposal bears similari
ties to Llewellyn's call for merchant juries to assist courts ex post in
1 1
interpreting industry-related terms. 1 The U .C.C. ultimately did not adopt
12
Llewellyn's notion of merchant juries. 1 We would go one step further than
Llewellyn, allowing parties not only to designate a third party to interpret
ambiguous terms in the contract into the future but also to rewrite even clear
terms in the contract.
Because several contracts can use the same boilerplate terms and make
the same legislative delegation, a standard setter given the "legislative" au
thority to determine the meaning of terms may change in one stroke the
collective market meaning of terms. This allows for quick adjustments to the
meaning of a term that applies consistently across an industry. Consistency
1 1 0. See id. at 547 ("[C]urrent law . . . holds that interpretation is an issue for courts to decide
and should be conducted according to rules that parties cannot vary."). Scott and Schwartz argue that
the method of court interpretation should be made a default, allowing parties to opt out of the de
fault. Unlike our proposal, however, they argue that the majoritarian default would be to adopt a
strict formalist interpretation approach. See id. at 569.
1 1 1 . See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 527-29 ( 1 987).
1 1 2.

See id.
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is important both to minimize the amount of conflict that may arise and to
facilitate transactions involving the contract in the secondary aftermarket.
Where speed is important in completing a contract, such as in the sovereign
debt market, consistency allows parties to focus only on the subset of terms
(typically pricing terms) where the parties are likely to disagree. In contrast,
if one court interprets a particular contract, uncertainty will arise whether a
second court will follow the first court's interpretation for another contract
with the same boilerplate terms. The arising uncertainty may cause the dis
count buyers of such contracts to demand compensation for the risk they
face that courts may change the meaning of the terms away from what they
expect.
How likely is it that parties would opt into a designated legislative
standard-setter approach to contractual boilerplate? Parties in certain
markets already explicitly opt to use a set of pre-existing definitional terms
provided through third parties. Swap contracts today make explicit reference
to the ISDA definitions in the Short-Form Confirmation sheets containing
the economic terms of an agreement. Parties need only agree to follow the
terms of a particular standard setter (without negotiating the specific terms)
when they opt into a pool of standardized terms.
How courts interpret boilerplate terms affects the incentives for a stan
dard-setting body to arise in an industry and the activities that such a
standard-setting body undertakes. Various reasons exist for a standard
1 13
setting entity not to arise in an industry, as discussed above. On the mar
gin, nonetheless, changing court interpretation of boilerplate terms will
provide greater incentives for industry-wide standard setters to organize and
provide boilerplate provisions. Under the current regime, courts will look to
how a standard setter defines a specific term only if such definitions are in
corporated into a specific contract. Otherwise, each contract is treated as a
separately negotiated instrument even if it contains boilerplate provisions.
Even where definitions from a standard-setting body are used in a contract,
the current interpretive regime imposes several large costs on such standard
setters.
First, courts will not look to what a standard-setting body does subse
quent to the formation of a particular contract as a definitive source for the
interpretation of that specific contract. While a fast-moving market may re
quire a change in how a particular term is used, the present lack of doctrinal
support deters a standard-setting body from doing so for the stock of exist
ing contracts. Second, because each contract is ultimately viewed as a
representation of the meeting of minds between a specific set of contracting
parties, these parties will have the ability to bring forward their own extrin
sic evidence on what they thought a particular boilerplate term meant,
trumping even the views of the standard-setting body. Where the specific
contracting parties are different (at least ex post at the litigation stage) from
the universe of potential users of a boilerplate term, they may thus skew the

I 13.

See supra Section LB.
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interpretation of a boilerplate term. At the very least, parties will face
greater uncertainty in how courts will interpret the term.
While standard-setting bodies thus may find it worthwhile to generate
boilerplate standards and definitions for a particular industry, the benefit
they provide (and thus the return they can make from developing boilerplate
terms) is truncated by the present contract interpretation regime. Taking a
statutory approach to boilerplate interpretation would ameliorate these costs,
thereby raising the return for standard-setting groups to generate boilerplate
terms in a greater number of industries with sophisticated parties.
Significantly, the delegation of authority to a third party to interpret am
biguous contract terms only changes to whom contracting parties delegate
authority. Already the (mandatory) default is that courts interpret the mean
ing of contracts for parties well after the contract is agreed upon. As shown
in the pari passu example, this authority on the part of courts can lead to
drastic ex post deviations from the ex ante understanding of the contracting
parties. Our proposal simply shifts the locus of interpretive authority away
from courts and toward standard-setting bodies in the industry to whom the
contracting parties agree to delegate interpretive authority at the time of
contracting. Shifts in how terms in pre-existing contracts are interpreted
may still occur-but now these changes are explicitly taken into account by
the contracting parties in designating an expert third party to guide these
changes rather than through the decentralized, non-expert rulings of courts.
One possible criticism of our proposal is that industry association
groups, while containing greater expertise, may not have the best interests of
all contracting parties in mind. It is unclear, however, what motivates courts
in interpreting contracts; courts internalize none of the interests in the indus
try. As well, a market incentive will exist for a designated legislative body to
work in the best interests of all in the industry. If a standard setter does not
take into account the joint interests of the market participants in the industry,
few new contracts would delegate authority to the standard setter. The dele
gation of authority on the part of sophisticated contracting parties at the time
of their contract provides, in our minds, presumptive evidence of the value
of the standard setter to all sides of the contract.
One could also imagine conditional delegation of authority, granting leg
islative powers to a standard-setting entity only so long as the entity
contains a specific proportion of members of a particular type (for example,
swap industry professional intermediaries in the case of ISDA). Alterna
tively, parties could conditionally delegate authority to entities only to the
extent the entity engages in a specified, formal deliberative process that is
inclusive of all interests in the industry in determining what to do with con
tract ambiguities. Contracting parties may worry that a standard-setting
entity to which they give their trust could change over time and no longer
represent their best interests. These forms of conditional delegation of au
thority provide assurance to the contracting parties that the entity will
continue, through time, to represent their particular interests. Partial delega
tion of authority is also possible, giving courts the authority to interpret
relatively plain language terms but giving residual authority to interpret
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more ambiguous provisions to an industry standard setter. A standard-setting
entity may reduce the fears that the entity may, in the future, no longer rep
resent the interests of all members in an industry with a detailed, specified
contract. Where matters are clear, courts would interpret such a provision,
turning to the standard-setting entity in the future only for contingent issues
left unresolved by the plain language of the term.
Another criticism of our proposal is that arbitration already provides
parties an ability to bypass court interpretations of boilerplate clauses. In
some ways, arbitration is similar to our proposal, allowing a third-party or
ganization the ability to substitute its interpretative authority in place of
court-based interpretation. For at least three reasons, however, arbitration is
inferior to a system that forces courts to pay legislative-like deference to a
third party source of interpretive authority.
First, arbitration is costly. Rather than incur the cost of establishing an
arbitration system, a third-party standard setter may wish to have courts in
terpret future ambiguities subject to deference to the association's
interpretations, if any. Court-based resolution of conflicts provides a subsidy
to a third-party group seeking to draft and refine boilerplate terms for an
industry. 1 1 4 So long as the courts pay appropriate deference to the intent of
the third-party group, as we advocate where the contracting parties specify
the third-party group as a "legislative body," the availability of court-based
adjudication allows the third-party group to focus its attention and resources
on developing terms that provide the greatest surplus for contracting parties.
Second, parties may not be sure how Jong a particular third-party group
may stay in existence. If boilerplate terms are used in contracts after the
third-party group ceases to exist, the possibility of arbitration may disappear
with the group. Court-based dispute resolution does not suffer from this
same risk. Moreover, even if a third-party organization dissolves, courts may
still apply deference to the intent of the organization at the time the boiler
plate terms were originally drafted in interpreting ambiguous terms.
Third, arbitration involves a different form of interpretation. Interpreta
tion that occurs through arbitration is relatively informal and decentralized.
Individual arbitrators make their own decision with respect to the meaning
of specific contract clauses. Parties may not wish third-party organizations
to interpret clauses in this fashion. Where parties are uncertain about the
motives of a third-party organization (particularly over time), the parties
may wish future interpretations to take place only through a broad, industry
wide deliberative process. Such a process is more visible in the industry
and, as a result, is more likely to generate criticisms if unbalanced in favor
of a particular subset of the industry. Relying on court-based interpretation
that pays deference only to industry-wide pronouncements by a designated
legislative third-party body provides an incentive for such groups to work
through more collective and visible means in clarifying and generating new
boilerplate terms.

1 1 4.

Of course, from an overall societal viewpoint, this subsidy is not cost free.
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B. Interpretation
What if parties make no such legislative designation in their contracts
(as is the case in all boilerplate terms in use today)? Our second insight is
that courts, when faced with the interpretation of boilerplate, should attempt
to construct how an industry-wide legislative body would have interpreted
the boilerplate term, an approach distinct from constructing what the spe
cific contracting parties would have done. Taking an industry-wide view
ensures that courts do not place undue weight on the individual contracting
parties before them. An industry-wide view also increases the likelihood that
other courts taking a similar approach will come to similar results, leading
to greater certainty in the marketplace on the meaning of the boilerplate
terms.
How should a court construct what an industry-wide legislative body
would have provided for in an ambiguous boilerplate provision? The start
ing point in an analysis of general market understanding should be the
historical understandings of a boilerplate clause, discerning the intent of the
1 15
original drafters of the term. This understanding includes direct evidence
of the intent of the drafters, such as memoranda detailing the purpose. The
historical record also includes how boilerplate terms fit into the overall
structure of the contract envisioned by the original drafters.
Much like the enacting legislative body for a statute, the original draft
ing parties provide the best source of information on the original meaning of
boilerplate contract terms. The original drafting parties will have spent the
most time and resources in negotiating the contract term (and thus represent
1 16
a true "meeting of the minds"). In a market populated with sophisticated
parties on all sides, the drafting parties necessarily must balance the inter
ests of all sides for a contract term to gain at least initial widespread
11
acceptance in the industry. 7 The fact that a boilerplate term gains initial
acceptance in a market consisting solely of sophisticated parties provides
1 18
some evidence as to the value of the term for all parties. The drafters will

1 1 S. Such an activity, while difficult, is often feasible even for terms that are over a century in
existence. For example, Lee Buchheit, the leading U.S. commentator on the meaning of sovereign
debt contract terms, and his colleague, Jeremy Pam, embarked on a largely successful historical
excavation of the pari passu clause's past. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 1 5 , at 89 1 -9 14.
1 1 6. To be clear, the "original drafting parties" referred to in the text are those who first adopt
the clause as a standard provision. That same clause or some version of it may have been used years
prior in idiosyncratic circumstances. But it is not the intentions of those idiosyncratic parties we are
interested in. Given that the goal is to discern the intentions underlying standard or boilerplate pro
visions, one has to go back to the point at which the clause becomes standardized. And that point
should be fairly easy to discern, given that there is likely to be some big event (war, large financial
crisis, revolution, oil shortage, etc.) that causes everyone to focus on the need to alter the existing
standard forms.
1 1 7. Once a standardized term becomes entrenched, the very fact that a term is the standard
may promote its continued use. And, as we discuss above, see supra Section 11.A.2.b, parties may
eventually forget the meanings of the terms, simply incorporating them into their contracts as an
automatic matter.
1 1 8.
analysis.

Once a term becomes standardized, parties may adopt the boilerplate term without much
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also enjoy an expertise advantage over any court attempting to interpret a
term. Courts looking to the historical record will increase the chance that a
court interpretation will better match the needs of the marketplace.
To the extent a historical record exists, a doctrine of deferring to this re
cord also encourages consistency across different courts interpreting the
same boilerplate provision. Varying parties in different litigation may have
idiosyncratic views of what a particular boilerplate term means. Different
courts, likewise, may come out with divergent opinions on what maximizes
the welfare of any particular set of contracting parties. The historical record
provides a common and fixed evidentiary source of the meaning of the term
across different litigation. Referring to this source first will minimize the
importance of idiosyncratic factors in separate litigation while stressing the
common element of the boilerplate terms.
One difficulty with looking to the historical understanding behind a boi
lerplate term is the potential lack of connection behind the understanding
and the particular context of the contracting parties that have chosen to
adopt the boilerplate term (often without much thought on the terms). Why
should it matter whether the drafters of a term from several decades in the
past intended a pari passu term to prohibit non-equal payments to creditors?
If the contracting parties had no intention one way or the other about allow
ing non-equal payments, it is unclear why allowing the historical
understanding to prevail will further the intent of the parties. Perversely, the
original drafters may not necessarily have the best interests of all contract
ing parties as their goal, instead adopting terms that systematically favor
groups with greater power and influence in the industry. Once a term be
comes standard in the industry, such terms may perpetuate themselves
despite their one-sided nature. 1 1 9 Nonetheless, advantages exist to relying on
the historical understanding of boilerplate terms.
First, making a clear historical understanding conclusive creates an in
centive for the original drafters to create a record in the first place. Over
time, a doctrine of deference to the historical record will lead to a greater
amount of information on the initial intent of the drafters of such terms.
Standard setters in an industry that provide such a record will increase the
certainty and value of their terms, leading to a greater likelihood that their
terms will become widespread in a particular industry and to more profit for
the standard setters (or value for the entities that establish a non-profit stan
dard setter). The record will also help flush out the motives of drafters. A
record that states that the drafters intend specific boilerplate terms to result
in outcomes that favor one set of contracting parties will make it more likely
that other (sophisticated) sets of contracting parties will refuse to use the
terms. Drafters could forego such a record, but at the risk that courts will not
interpret the term as they had wished.
Second, the probability that historical understanding may be outdated
must be compared with the probability of court error in interpreting a boi
lerplate contract using standard interpretive techniques. Of course, the
1 1 9.

See Bernstein, supra note 1 8, at 754-56.

March 2006]

Contract as Statute

1 1 69

farther back in time the historical understanding, the greater the likelihood
of the understanding becoming outdated. For boilerplate terms, the cost of a
court error differs depending on whether it uses a historical or standard con
tract interpretation approach. When a court makes an error using standard
contract interpretation techniques, the error is likely to chill a market re
sponse. Because of the focus on the specific intent of the contracting parties,
outside third parties (including industry groups) are unlikely to have much
persuasive power over a single court as to the meaning of a term. Coordina
tion over litigation may therefore take place at a later time and with less
effort due to the lessened influence of outside, third party views on the in
terpretation of a particular term.
The standard approach to contract interpretation is also likely to chill a
coordinated response to draft new terms that better reflect the market's pref
erences. As we discuss above, market participants may fear courts will
misconstrue an uncoordinated response immediately after a court interpre
tive shock as supporting the view that the interpretive shock correctly
characterized the market's prior understanding of a term. Market partici
pants will hesitate to respond as a result. After the initial delay (sometimes
taking years), a coordinated response may become possible as in the pari
passu example. But by this time, even a coordinated change in the contract
terms is unlikely to persuade a court that there existed a different market
understanding from a now-prior court interpretation. Indeed, a market-wide
shift after such a long delay may signal that the older pre-existing terms were
in fact different from the new terms to which the market moves. Of course,
courts could interpret a market-wide shift the other way. The key point here is
that much uncertainty exists in how courts will react. Rather than run the risk
of negatively affecting how courts will interpret a term contained in a large
number of already outstanding contracts, market participants will not focus
on clarifying the contract term language but instead focus on winning the
litigation battle.
In contrast, where courts take a historical approach to interpretation, the
market response to a court error in interpretation is likely to differ. The his
torical approach does not focus initially on how dispersed parties react to a
prior court interpretation of a boilerplate term. Instead, the focus is on the
historical understanding of the original drafters, giving parties greater lee
way to clarify the language of contract terms adopted after the shock
without fear that this change will be used to interpret pre-existing terms ad
versely to the parties' interests. The historical approach, as a result, allows
market participants to develop new, clearer terms immediately after an in
terpretive shock.
We concede a cost to our approach. Markets often find it difficult and
costly to put new boilerplate terms in place. Restricting courts to original in
tent, that is, not giving legal recognition to evolving meaning, forces on
parties the cost of being stuck with original meaning until resources can be
coordinated to produce a market-wide shift. If, however, the result of our pro
posal is the emergence of a standard setter that can engineer changes in
boilerplate at a low cost, the problem is ameliorated. Plus, if the preservation
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of historical understandings makes it easier for coordination around innova
tions in language to take place, there is an additional ameliorative effect.
C. Other Industry- Wide Sources ofAuthority
In some situations, the task of determining the historical understanding
of a boilerplate term is straightforward. Where an industry association exists
that maintains a detailed set of boilerplate terms for use in the industry, the
historical understanding is easily observable. Consider the meaning of the
terms in the ISDA M aster Agreement. Not only is ISDA present to clarify
the meaning of its terms, but ISDA also publishes a detailed User's Guide
detailing the purpose and operation of its terms. In other situations, deter
mining historical understandings is more difficult. A specific set of attorneys
at an individual law firm many decades in the past may have crafted a par
ticular clause. Over time, the term may become incorporated in a greater
number of deals, traveling (through cut-and-paste) from contract to contract
and law firm to law firm. As the term moves across firms and time, it may
be subject to minor changes-word shifts, additional punctuation marks,
one person's sense of style replacing another's. As we discuss above, with
out a written record documenting the spread of a particular boilerplate term,
as is absent in the sovereign bond context, the historical understandings will
inevitably become lost.
What if the historical record is either absent or ambiguous in meaning?
Courts attempting to construct what an industry-wide standard setter would
do should next tum to industry views on the meaning of the terms, placing
greater weight on groups that aggregate the interests of a greater portion of
the industry (and have reputational interests at stake). Courts should look to
amicus briefs and other sources from industry groups and others providing
evidence on the historical record. Even where an industry-wide group does
not exist, but instead a court is faced with disparate views across the indus
try, our approach will result in a better approximation of what maximizes
the welfare of all industry participants compared with simply focusing on
the specific contracting parties before a court.
If an industry-wide aggregating body exists, why not presume that the
body speaks for all contracting parties in the industry and defer to the
group's current understanding of the term without deference to historical
understandings? Even where an industry aggregating body such as ISDA
exists, turning to historical precedent first provides value. Historical prece
dence may better comport with what contracting parties at the time thought
they were getting in incorporating a boilerplate provision. Stressing histori
cal precedence also places a burden on an aggregating entity to go through
the formal process of putting forward new terms to change the historical
precedent, creating a "focal" point for those in the industry. While a group
such as ISDA may aggregate the interests of most members of an industry,
going through the process of promulgating a new set of terms may heighten
the awareness of the industry with respect to the process, ensuring greater
participation of the range of industry participants in the redrafting process.
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More industry participants may take notice if an industry association goes
through the process of drafting a new set of model terms than if the associa
tion puts out an opinion letter on the interpretation of pre-existing terms.
Giving deference to the historical context and the intent of the original
drafters also gives industry groups an incentive to draft new terms to resolve
ambiguities. With the drafting of a new term, the industry group becomes
the "original" drafter and, under our proposal, obtains primary deference
from courts. Industry groups will also have an incentive to create a detailed
record at the time they draft a new term on the meaning of the term to en
sure that courts taking a statutory approach to interpreting boilerplate terms
have a rich "legislative" history from which to find guidance.
A criticism of our proposal might be that for many markets with boiler
plate, there are no market-wide deliberative bodies that attempt to
collectivize the interests of all (or even most) market participants. The pres
ence (or absence) of trade associations and other groups, however, is
endogenous. A shift in contract interpretation doctrine giving industry asso
ciations more weight in the interpretation of standardized contract terms will
result in more industry associations forming.
In many industries, there already exist efforts to centralize the creation
and modification of centralized terms. Consider again ISDA. When swap
derivative contracts first came onto the financial scene, a large variety of
terms and contracts arose in the marketplace. The variety, however, led to
uncertainty in the precise meaning of terms. Industry participants worked to
centralize the definition of key terms through the creation of ISDA. ISDA
today provides a glossary of standardized terms. Contracting parties may
then reference the ISDA terms as part of their contracts, incorporating by
reference the contemporaneous ISDA definitions into their contract.
Not all industries will have a clear, aggregating industry body such as
ISDA. In such industries, courts must determine which industry groups or
associations to look to in interpreting contracts. At first glance ; this seems a
formidable problem. Where one dominant group arises (such as ISDA) that
all market participants look to, then a court may simply look to this domi
nant group. But what if competing groups arise? And what if some groups
systematically favor certain market participants (for example, investors over
issuers or vice versa)? Where such groups are able to agree on the meaning
of boilerplate terms, nonetheless, such an agreement allows courts to find
interpretations that increase the value of market participants while removing
courts directly from the decisionmaking process on the exact meaning of
terms. Looking to historical precedence also mitigates the problem of multi
ple competing groups. Courts look only second to the opinion of industry
groups. Where more than one such group exists, or if the sole group does
not represent the interests of all the participants in the industry, then a court
may give less weight to the opinions of such competing groups.
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D. The Disaggregated Contract
A primary advantage of the historical approach to interpreting boiler
plate is the emphasis on looking to the intent of the original drafters of a
particular boilerplate clause. The focus on sources outside of the particular
contract and contracting parties provides a new way of looking at the con
tract as a whole. Rather than one cohesive document, negotiated at one
singular point in time, a contract containing boilerplate language is a con
glomeration of different pieces. Each piece may have a different history and
timing.
We saw in the example involving Mexico's shift from UAC to CAC
terms that different boilerplate terms in the same contract may be in conflict
with one another. A historical boilerplate analysis recognizes that contradic
tory provisions can exist, especially where one provision is a recent addition
and another is a historical hold over. To the extent the two contradict each
other, the provision more recent in time would be held to trump because it
was clearly intended to replace the other older provision.
We hypothesize that the lawyers for Mexico were so focused on altering
the modification provisions from unanimity to 75%, that they failed to
notice that there were other portions of the contract that were inconsistent
with that move. Unearthing a historical understanding of the Obligations
Absolute term would reveal it to be a remnant of the UAC provision;
something that the prospectus and other sale documents clearly indicate was
meant to be modified and replaced by the 75% term. A strict textual and
traditional analysis would neither allow for consideration of when the terms
arose as a matter or history or consideration of information in the prospectus
(the latter not being considered to be part of the contract). But, to recognize
the reality of how these documents evolve and how certain terms can get
forgotten but nevertheless retained in the contracts will help courts reach a
more accurate understanding of the reality of what the contract is intended
to mean.
CONCLUSION
The standard approach to contract interpretation in the context of com
mercial boilerplate terms generates perverse results and diminishes the
incentives of market participants to generate new terms and clarify the
meaning of existing boilerplate terms. If the market corrected for court mis
takes quickly, such errors would impose little cost. However, dispersed
contracting parties may take time to coordinate in an effort to put forward
new contract terms. The presence of ongoing litigation may chill the incen
tives of parties to draft new terms, shifting the focus of any coordinated
efforts onto affecting the litigation itself.
In response to these problems, we propose a new approach to contract
interpretation for commercial boilerplate terms. Under our approach, courts
would interpret boilerplate terms similarly with statutes. Where parties ex
plicitly opt to select an industry standard setter to act as the authoritative
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interpretive source, courts should simply defer to this standard setter. Where
parties do not explicitly opt for a standard setter but nonetheless use well
wom boilerplate terms, courts should follow a similar contract-as-statute
approach in interpretation. Under such an approach, courts should look to
the intent of the original drafters of the boilerplate term and the historical
context of the usage of the term.
Taking a statutory approach toward interpreting commercial boilerplate
allows courts to rethink the nature of any one contract. Instead of a single
document created at one moment in time when contracting parties arrive at a
meeting of the minds, a contract with boilerplate terms represents a mixture
of different components, each with potentially different timing at which ac
tual agreement (by the initial drafters) on the meaning was determined.
Courts may take advantage of this differential timing, resolving conflicts
between different boilerplate provisions by giving priority to boilerplate
terms drafted more recently in time. Our approach moves toward viewing
contracts as interconnected parts of a larger overall commercial network that
ties market participants to one another.
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